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5Abstract
This thesis proposes alternative ways to price contingent claims written on portfolios of
credit instruments as well as on carbon underlying assets. On the first topic of this re-
search we tackle the pricing of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) by introducing two
different approaches through the application of respectively Johnson SB distributions and
entropy optimization principles, in contrast to market standard pricing approaches based
on variations of the Gaussian copula model. The relevance of this topic is in line with the
events that unfolded during the “credit crunch” of mid-2007 to early 2009, when CDOs
made headlines as being responsible for more than $542 billion in losses through write-
downs by financial institutions. On the second topic we propose a pricing methodology
for Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA) contracts. These are instruments
based on carbon as an asset class and created by the emergence of an international carbon
market that followed the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (KP) to the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in December 1997. ERPAs are of vital
importance to the function of KP’s market mechanisms and the carbon markets at large
as they formalize transactions of emissions reduction offsets between sellers and buyers,
more specifically transactions involving Certified Emission Reductions (CERs). We pro-
pose a pricing methodology based on stochastic modeling of CER volume delivery risk and
carbon prices as the two main drivers underlying ERPAs, and apply it to a case study on a
run-of-river hydro power CDM project activity in China.
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9Publication
One of the topics the research presented in this thesis is coming up in the following publi-
cation:
M. Labre and C. Atkinson. On the pricing of emission reduction purchase agreement con-
tracts, Journal of Energy Markets, Volume 3, Number 2, Summer 2010.
Abstract
The vital importance of Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA) contracts to the
carbon market motivates the development of accurate valuation techniques. We propose
a pricing methodology based on the formulation of a generic payoff function, with an
analyses of underlying drivers (emissions reduction delivery and carbon prices) leading
to their stochastic model representation. Although applicable to any emissions reduction
markets and standards, the rationale is developed around ERPAs based on delivery of Cer-
tified Emission Reduction (CER) certificates from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
project activities. We apply the methodology to the pricing of ERPAs on run-of-river hydro
power CDM project activities in China.
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Introduction
This thesis proposes alternative ways to price contingent claims written on portfolios of
credit instruments as well as on carbon underlying assets. We start in chapter 1 with an
overview of the mathematical tools used in the development of the research on these two
topics. More specifically, in section 1.1 we introduce the Johnson family of distributions,
which are parametric distributions based on transformations of observed random variables
into normally distributed ones. This transformation aspect allows Johnson distributions to
be reasonably tractable while being able to handle skewness and fat-tails. Then in sec-
tion 1.2 we discuss the powerful idea of entropy in the context of uncertainty measure, and
introduce optimization principles and techniques widely applied in this research. Chapter 1
concludes with a brief introduction of Goodwin’s quadrature formula in section 1.3.
The first topic of this thesis is focused on the pricing of Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDOs) and is described in chapter 2. With a market size reaching over $2 trillion by the
end of 2006, there is no debate about the importance that CDOs have had to the financial
industry over the past 6 years. However, CDOs only became known by the general public
once they made headlines during the unfolding of the credit crisis from mid-2007 to early
2009, when CDOs were blamed as one of the culprits for the worst financial crisis since
the Great Depression of the 1930’s. It is estimated that CDOs were responsible for $542
billion in losses due to write-downs suffered by financial institutions in 2007 alone. Among
the many factors that caused this were the pricing and risk assessment involved in CDO
positions, clearly observed by the fact that most of the securities marked down were initially
given a rating of AAA by one or more of the three internationally recognized credit rating
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agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poors and and Fitch).
In this context, in chapter 2 we challenge the standard model paradigm for CDOs based on
variations of the application of Gaussian copulas by proposing two alternative approaches
to price CDOs. We start chapter 2 in section 2.1 with an explanation of the CDO payoff
structure and an overview of the Gaussian copula and its application on pricing CDOs, con-
cluding the section with the formulation of the CDO payoff function. Then in section 2.2
we detail the first alternative approach based on modeling the loss distribution of a CDO’s
underlying portfolio with JSB distributions, including formulation and calibration of the
model. And in section 2.3 we elaborate on the formulation and calibration of CDO pricing
with our second approach, based on entropy optimization principles and techniques. Fi-
nally, in section 2.4 we show the application of both approaches and compare their results
to market prices.
In chapter 3 we discuss the second topic of this thesis based on carbon as an asset class,
created by the emergence of an international carbon market following the adoption of the
Kyoto Protocol (KP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) in December 1997. The KP represents the first time governments accepted
legally-binding constraints on their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in order to mitigate
climate change. Under the hypothesis that where emissions reductions are achieved is irrel-
evant to the planet’s climate system, the KP created innovative market-based mechanisms
aimed at achieving these reductions where they are least costly. One such mechanism is
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), with the premise that emissions reduction can
be achieved at a lower cost in developing countries than it could be done domestically by a
developed country with caps on emissions.
Based on this, chapter 3 proposes a methodology for pricing Emission Reduction Purchase
Agreement (ERPA) contracts, which are vital to the function of the CDM and the carbon
market at large. With the CDM, participants may claim Certified Emission Reductions
(CERs) through the implementation of projects that reduce emissions below a certain base-
line scenario. These CERs are issued by the UNFCCC to project participants through a
thorough process that starts with the registration of emissions reduction projects and ends
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with emissions reduction monitoring, verification and certification. Once issued, CERs can
be sold to governments of countries with binding targets on emissions under the KP or to
industry participants under an emissions cap-and-trade system established by their respec-
tive governments (e.g., European Union Emissions Trading Scheme). These transactions
involving CERs are formalized by an ERPA.
Thus, we start chapter 3 in section 3.1 with a detailed explanation of the CDM project cy-
cle and draw on a probability tree representation of the risks in CER delivery through the
various CDM project stages. In section 3.2 we propose a pricing methodology based on
the formulation of a generic payoff function and the analysis of underlying drivers such as
delivery risk and carbon prices. More specifically, in section 3.2.3 we model the delivery
dynamics with JSB distributions and calibrate it by applying entropy optimization tech-
niques, and in section 3.2.4 a Bounded Geometric Brownian Motion (GBGM) is proposed
for carbon prices dynamics. Finally, in section 3.3 we establish a pricing algorithm and
apply the models and techniques proposed with a case study on a run-of-river hydro power
CDM project activities in China.
We conclude by revisiting the two topics of this thesis through an overview of the research
performed and results achieved. In addition, we propose future research that builds on the
foundations established on these topics.
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Chapter 1
Mathematical Tools
Introduction
In this chapter we elaborate on the mathematical tools used on the pricing of the contingent
claims discussed in the chapters that follow. We start by introducing the Johnson family
of distributions in section 1.1, followed by a thorough discussion of entropy optimization
principles and techniques in section 1.2. We conclude with a brief exposition of Goodwin’s
quadrature formula in section 1.3.
1.1 The Johnson family of distributions
Johnson distributions originally come from the field of statistics and over time have been
applied to a wide variety of applications in analysis and modeling of sample data in various
disciplines. As pointed out by Johnson [25], although the normal distribution has always
played a central role in statistical analysis, it is apparent that it cannot adequately repre-
sent many of the distribution laws observed in random numbers from natural and economic
processes. Given the properties of the normal distribution and its mathematical tractabil-
ity, it became natural to consider transformations of certain probability distributions into
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the normal distribution. The Johnson system appears in this context, where parametric
transformations of an observed random variable into a normally distributed one allows for
probability density functions that are reasonably tractable while able to handle skewness
and fat-tails. Johnson [25] first illustrated the transformation of a random variable x to
normality in the form
z = g(x) ∼ Φ(0, 1),
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function, z is standard normally distributed
and g a transformation function.
In principle it is possible to find one single function that can exactly match that condition.
However, as pointed out by Elderton and Johnson [10], this function would be so com-
plicated that would defeat the purpose of the transformation. Elderton and Johnson [10]
mentioned that this should be a simple function expressed in terms of a few arbitrary pa-
rameters as well as enable a wide variety of distributions to be represented. Hahn and
Shapiro [18] show the general form of this transformation with four parameters to be
z = a+ bg(c, d, x) ∼ Φ(0, 1), (1.1)
where a and b are parameters defining the shape of the transformation, while g should be
a monotonic non-decreasing function of x and must be (−∞,+∞) given the domain of z.
As described in Johnson [25], three alternative forms of families for g were proposed as
gSL(c, d, x) = log
(
x− c
d
)
, (1.2a)
gSU(c, d, x) = sinh
−1
(
x− c
d
)
, (1.2b)
gSB(c, d, x) = log
(
x− c
c+ d− x
)
, (1.2c)
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where c and d are respectively location and scale parameters. Elderton and Johnson [10]
later showed that each of these transformations translate respectively into the probability
density functions
fSL(x) =
b√
2pi(x− c) exp
{
−1
2
[
a+ b log
(
x− c
d
)]2}
, (1.3a)
fSU(x) =
b
d
√
2pi
[
1 +
(
x− c
d
)2]− 12
exp
{
−1
2
[
a+ b sinh−1
(
x− c
d
)]2}
, (1.3b)
fSB(x) =
b√
2pi
d
(x− c)(c+ d− x) exp
{
−1
2
[
a+ b log
(
x− c
c+ d− x
)]2}
, (1.3c)
where the translation caused by applying one of the relationships in (1.2) can be seen in
Figure 1.1.
The transformation defined by (1.2a) resulting in the probability density (1.3a) is known as
the Johnson SL (JSL) system which represents a shifted log-normal distribution, where the
parameter domain is c ≤ x < +∞, −∞ < a < +∞, 0 < b < +∞, −∞ < c < +∞, 0 <
d < +∞. On the other hand, the transformation in (1.2b) is known as Johnson SU (JSU)
system as x is unbounded and the probability density of (1.3b) departs from log-normality
shapes depending on the values of its parameters, with domain defined as−∞ < x < +∞,
−∞ < a < +∞, 0 < b < +∞, −∞ < c < +∞, 0 < d < +∞. Finally in the Johnson
SB (JSB) transformation, x is bounded and defined within the domain c ≤ x ≤ c+ d, with
−∞ < c < +∞, 0 < d < +∞, −∞ < a < +∞ and 0 < b < +∞, making it a powerful
choice for representing a variety of bounded random variables.
Note that the probability density for x maps into the normal distribution given the transfor-
mation in (1.1). This yields the cumulative distribution function of the functions in (1.3) as
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Figure 1.1: Translation the Johnson SB distribution, with a = γ, b = δ, c = ξ and d = λ
(Johnson [25])
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simply
JSL(x) = Φ
[
a+ b log
(
x− c
d
)]
, (1.4a)
JSU(x) = Φ
[
a+ b sinh−1
(
x− c
d
)]
and (1.4b)
JSB(x) = Φ
[
a+ b log
(
x− c
c+ d− x
)]
. (1.4c)
Using one of the three Johnson families to fit the behavior of random variables implies an
approximation of the real probability distribution by its first four moments, due to only
four parameters (or degrees of freedom) defining each of those families. This is an ap-
proximation with higher moments (skewness and kurtosis) as compared to assuming pure
normality, while still keeping tractability for analytical solutions. If β1 and β2 are defined
as
√
β1 =
µ3
µ
3/2
2
(1.5a)
β2 =
µ4
µ22
(1.5b)
where µ2, µ3 and µ4 are respectively the second, third and fourth moments about the mean
of a probability distribution, Hahn and Shapiro [18] show that the three Johnson transforma-
tions accommodate a broad scope of possible distribution shapes, as illustrated graphically
in Figure 1.2.
Another well known system of transformation was proposed early on by Pearson [40],
where a Pearson density f(x) is defined to be any valid solution to the differential equation
df(x)
dx
=
x− α3
α0 + α1x+ α2x2
. (1.6)
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Figure 1.2: Space of distributions that can be represented by the Johnson family (Hahn and
Shapiro [18])
This is also able to represent a large number of distribution families as showed in Fig-
ure 1.3. However, As pointed out by Hahn and Shapiro [18], the procedures for fitting
Pearson distributions are lengthy since each type requires solution of a different set of dif-
ferential equations. From this perspective we favor the use of the Johnson family due to its
simplicity, tractability and ease of fitting extensively demonstrated in the literature. We are
particularly interested in the transformation JSB defined in (1.2c), given the highly non-
normal and bounded nature of the random variables in the applications of this research.
1.2 Entropy optimization
Although originated in the literature on thermodynamics, the term entropy has found its
way into almost all disciplines. This is mainly due to its association with the concept
of information introduced in an influential article by Shannon [46], which established the
foundations of the field of information theory. In other to give clarity to the concept of
entropy, it is useful to make a parallel to the intuitive understanding of entropy as a measure
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Figure 1.3: Space of distributions that can be represented by the Pearson family
of uncertainty. In our case we are interested in probabilistic uncertainty, i.e., from an
experiment with n possible outcomes with probabilities p1, p2, · · · , pn where p1 ≥ 0, p2 ≥
0, . . . , pn ≥ 0 and
n∑
i=1
pi = 1. (1.7)
A classic example given in Kapur and Kesavan [29] illustrates the idea that the uncer-
tainty of the probability distribution (0.5,0.5) for a coin tossing is much higher than the
one of the probability distribution (0.00001,0.99999) of winning or not winning a lottery,
and therefore the entropy in the former is much higher than in the latter. This example re-
veals the fact that the distribution of tossing a coin has the highest possible entropy among
all distributions defined by only two outcomes, given that any other distribution different
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from (0.5,0.5) would decrease the uncertainty by increasing the likelihood of one of the
outcomes by meeting condition (1.7). It generally points out that knowledge of the level
of uncertainty about the underlying event is crucial in order to assess its outcomes. The
most well known measure of uncertainty was introduced by Shannon [46], who proposed a
measure of uncertainty of a probability distribution given by
S = −
n∑
i=1
pi log pi (1.8)
and called it entropy as it is the same expression for entropy in thermodynamics.
An important idea involving this entropy measure is about estimating probability distribu-
tions by reducing the uncertainty under the available information. For instance, consider
two matches have already been played in a five-match playoff for the title of a basketball
tournament, where we wish to assess the odds of teams A or B to be winners in the con-
test. If we have absolutely no information about the two teams and the results of the two
previous playoff matches, the best estimate we can possibly make is 50%-50% which hap-
pens to yield the highest entropy if no available information. Any odds different than this
represent a bias of possible outcomes, and one would feel more confortable placing a bet
on these odds as there is no justifiable reason to choose any other. On the other hand, if we
were aware that team A was the winner in the first two matches, the odds would change
to 75%-25% given A becomes champion by another single victory in any of the next 3
matches while B must win the next three matches. Conditional on this new information,
75%-25% seems to offer the highest entropy level given higher entropic 50%-50% odds
would represent a biased choice. Now consider that we know that three of the best players
of team A are either injured or suspended and unable to play the next three matches, two
of which will be played on team B’s home ground. In this case it is unlikely 75%-25% is
right and unbiased odds might be back to 50%-50%.
This example shows how the arrival of new information changes perception of the probabil-
ities that represent the outcome of certain events. Furthermore, the example also introduces
the idea of entropy maximization by demonstrating that the fair or unbiased choice for these
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probabilities is the one that yields the highest entropy conditional on the available informa-
tion. It may sound paradoxical that we achieve our goal of assessing appropriate probability
distributions by maximizing uncertainty. The idea has parallel with Laplace’s principle of
insufficient reason, which argues that if we have no information except that each pi ≥ 0
and the sum of the probabilities is unity, we should choose the uniform distribution since
we have no reason to choose any other. In this sense, being most uncertain means being
nearest to the unform distribution (the one with the highest entropy) but this is exactly the
path to a least biased assessment of a probability distribution. Out of an infinite number of
possibilities, maximizing the entropy enables us to choose one for the simple reason that
the use of any other implies assuming information that has not been given.
These arguments provide the background for introducing the Maximum Entropy Princi-
ple (MaxEnt) originally proposed in Jaynes [23] and [24], which provided a quantitative
technique for assigning probabilities based on the commonsensical concept of using only
the information provided. In his two seminal articles, Jaynes proposed that a least biased
probability distribution of a random variable xi for {i = 1, · · · , n} is achieved by maxi-
mizing Shannon’s measure (1.8) conditional to a normalization constraint (1.7) and to a set
of functional form constraints written as
n∑
i=1
hk(xi)pi − ck = 0, {k = 1, 2, · · · m}, (1.9)
where hk(xi) are constraint functions and ck are constants for {k = 1, 2, · · · m}.
As shown by Kapur and Kesavan [29], Shannon’s measure is a concave function of {p1, · · · , pn},
which guarantees the existence and uniqueness of a probability distribution that maximizes
the entropy. In order to find the MaxEnt probability distribution, we first write the La-
grangian equation as
L = −
n∑
i=1
pi log pi − (λ0 − 1)
(
n∑
i=1
pi − 1
)
−
m∑
k=1
λk
(
n∑
i=1
hk(xi)pi − ck
)
, (1.10)
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where {λ0, λ1, · · · , λm} are m + 1 Lagrange multipliers corresponding to the m + 1 con-
straints of (1.7) and (1.9). Now we make
∂L
∂pi
= 0⇒ − log pi − λ0 −
m∑
k=1
λkhk(xi) = 0,
which results in
pi = exp
[
−λ0 −
m∑
k=1
λkhk(xi)
]
.
The multipliers are determined by substituting pi into (1.7) and (1.9), i.e.,
n∑
i=1
exp
[
−λ0 −
m∑
k=1
λkhk(xi)
]
= 1,
n∑
i=1
hk(xi) exp
[
−λ0 −
m∑
k=1
λkhk(xi)
]
− ck = 0, {k = 1, 2, · · · m}.
The former equation gives
exp(λ0) =
n∑
i=1
exp
[
−
m∑
k=1
λkhk(xi)
]
,
which is substituted in the latter equation to yield
n∑
i=1
(hk(xi)− ck) exp
[
−
m∑
j=1
λjhj(xi)
]
= 0, {k = 1, 2, · · · m}. (1.11)
The relation above represents a system of m nonlinear equations that can be solved for m
Lagrange multipliers {λ1, · · · , λm}, where we can write pi as
Chapter 1. Mathematical Tools 23
pi =
exp [−∑mk=1 λkhk(xi)]∑n
j=1 exp [−
∑m
k=1 λkhk(xj)]
. (1.12)
Now suppose we have information in the form of a prior probability distribution qi, which
may be based on intuition or previous experience with random variable xi. Kullback and
Leibler [31] introduced the measure
K =
n∑
i=1
pi log
pi
qi
(1.13)
which can reasonably be used as a measure of divergence of pi in respect to qi, and for that
reason called relative entropy measure. We verified before that from MaxEnt and in the
absence of (1.9) one chooses the uniform distribution as the least biased distribution. This
principle also applies to a given prior distribution, as there would no reason to choose any
other distribution (including the uniform distribution) for an estimate of the least biased
distribution of xi in the absence of any other information. In addition to further available
information in the form of functional constraints, Kullback and Leibler [31] proposed the
Minimum Entropy Principle (MinEnt) which consists in finding the unbiased distribution
of xi by minimizing (1.13) given a prior distribution qi and conditional to the normalization
(1.7) and the functional constraints (1.9). As before, Kapur and Kesavan [29] showed that
(1.13) is a convex function, therefore having a global minimum and guaranteeing that pi
exists and is unique. In this case, we write the Lagrangian as
L =
n∑
i=1
pi log pi −
n∑
i=1
pi log qi − (λ0 − 1)
(
n∑
i=1
pi − 1
)
−
m∑
k=1
λk
(
n∑
i=1
hk(xi)pi − ck
)
,
(1.14)
which gives
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∂L
∂pi
= 0⇒ log pi − log qi − λ0 −
m∑
k=1
λkhk(xi) = 0.
The same steps are followed as with MaxEnt to yield
n∑
i=1
qi(hk(xi)− ck) exp
[
−
m∑
k=1
λkhk(xi)
]
= 0, {k = 1, 2, · · · m} (1.15)
as the system of m nonlinear equations that can be solved for the Lagrange multipliers, and
pi = qi
exp [−∑mk=1 λkhk(xi)]∑n
j=1 qj exp [−
∑m
k=1 λkhk(xj)]
(1.16)
as the unbiased probability distribution with {λ1, · · · , λm}. Note that MinEnt can be inter-
preted as a generalization of the MaxEnt Principle, where minimizing the relative entropy
(1.13) for the same set of constraints is equivalent to maximizing the entropy in (1.8). This
is easily observed in the case of the prior distribution being the uniform distribution, i.e.,
K =
n∑
i=1
pi log
pi
qi
=
n∑
i=1
pi log
pi
(1/n)
= log n−
(
−
n∑
i=1
pi log pi
)
= log n− S .
As detailed by Kapur and Kesavan [29], the MaxEnt and MinEnt principles can be written
in continuous form, which is very useful for applications in this research. First, Jayne’s
MaxEnt can be changed to maximizing
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S = −
∫ XB
XA
f(x) log f(x)dx, (1.17)
conditional to the normalization constraint
∫ XB
XA
f(x)dx = 1 (1.18)
and functional constraints
∫ XB
XA
hk(x)f(x)dx− ck = 0, {k = 1 . . . Nk}. (1.19)
Similarly, the MinEnt by Kullback and Leibler then consists in minimizing
K =
∫ XB
XA
f(x) log
f(x)
g(x)
dx (1.20)
conditional to (1.18) and (1.19).
1.3 Goodwin’s quadrature formula
A useful quadrature formula is introduced by Goodwin [16], which proposes a method to
evaluate integrals of the form
∫ +∞
−∞
f(x)e−x
2
dx = h
+∞∑
n=−∞
f(nh)e−n
2h2 − (h). (1.21)
From this equation, n intervals of size h define the discretization of the domain of x and
(h) is the the error term. Goodwin indicates in his article that the error is only likely to
be underestimated when f(x) tends rapidly to infinity with x. He shows that using this
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formula with functions such as f(x) = x2 is still quite accurate, where in such cases the
error term tends rapidly to zero with h. We observed negligible values for the error with
n ≥ 100 and h ≤ 0.03, an inexpensive parameter domain in terms of computational effort.
Given the type of integrals involved throughout this research, we make extensive use of
Goodwin’s quadrature formula.
Conclusion
In this chapter we discussed the mathematical tools used on the pricing of the contingent
claims discussed in the chapters that follow. In section section 1.1 we introduced the John-
son family of distributions, followed by the discussion of entropy optimization principles
and techniques in section 1.2. We concluded with a brief introduction to Goodwin’s quadra-
ture formula in section 1.3. The application of these tools become clear in the chapters that
follow.
27
Chapter 2
Pricing Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDOs)
Introduction
The importance that Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) have had to the financial in-
dustry over the past 6 years is unquestionable. By 2005 the CDO market had reached over
$1.5 trillion and is estimated to have topped $2 trillion by the end of 2006,∗ after when it
started its decline due to the unfolding of the credit crisis from mid-2007 to early 2009.
Once a money making machine of the investment banking industry, CDOs are one of the
main culprits for the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930’s, being
responsible for $542 billion in losses due to write-downs suffered by financial institutions in
2007 alone.† Among the many factors involved in its failure is pricing and risk assessment,
clearly observed through the fact that most of the securities marked down were initially
given a rating of AAA by one or more of the three internationally recognized credit rating
∗Report Published by research firm Celent available at http://reports.celent.com/
PressReleases/20051031/CDOMarket.htm.
†CreditFlux Newsletter of January 2008, available at http://www.creditflux.com/
Newsletter/January-2008/.
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agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poors and and Fitch).
Although new issuances of CDOs are nowadays limited, the pricing and risk management
of legacy securities and agreements remain a topic of central importance to the invest-
ment banking industry as well as the governments that ultimately intervened with bail out
packages. From this perspective, this chapter offers viable alternatives to the standard mar-
ket models through two top-down approaches for pricing CDOs, challenging main stream
research and market practices based on bottom-up approaches such as the one-factor Gaus-
sian copula. First we introduce the reader to the different types of CDOs as well as their
payoff structure and features. This is followed by a review of the one-factor Gaussian
copula and its adjustment by practitioners via base correlations, widely recognized as the
market standard for pricing CDOs. We then elaborate on the CDO payoff function and
apply it in both the Johnson SB and the Entropy approaches that follow. We formulate
the model and discuss calibration techniques in each of these approaches, after which we
present results through a practical application.
2.1 The Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO)
2.1.1 Introduction
The core principle behind CDOs revolves around diversification through portfolios. These
are structures written on the credit worthiness of obligors in an underlying portfolio, where
spreading the risk of credit default across a large number of names significantly reduces
the risk of an investment by lending to be wiped out. In theory, this should offer a more
stable risk versus return profile, where a typical cash CDO∗ involves the packaging of var-
ious fixed income securities in a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or Structured Investment
Vehicle (SIV). These securities are typically corporate and sovereign bonds and loans in
case of institutional portfolios, or individual loans and commercial obligations for CDOs
written on Mortgage-Backed and Commercial-Backed Securities (respectively MBS and
∗Cash CDOs represent the majority of the transactions involved in the recent credit crisis.
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CBS). The SPE or SIV buys these underlying securities for the purpose of using their cash
flows to back the issuance of specific notes or bonds, which are divided into a number of
tranches with different claims on the principal and interest generated by the portfolio.
A more detailed discussion about CDO’s different types, structures and characteristics can
be found in J.P. Morgan Securities [27], Bank of America Securities [4] and The Royal
Bank of Scotland [49]. For the purpose of our research, we are particularly more interested
in synthetic CDOs written on portfolios of institutional obligors. A synthetic CDO behaves
mathematically in exactly the same way as a cash CDO, but its underlying portfolio is
based on credit default swaps (CDSs)∗ instead of corporate or sovereign bonds. Synthetic
CDOs enjoyed high transactional volume during the credit derivatives boom due to their
CDS portfolios, given CDSs on the larger obligors were extremely liquid and provided a
high degree of price discovery. In addition, CDS prices reflect a clean measure of default
expectations as viewed by the market, while bonds and loans are still shaded by interest
rates movements.
Figure 2.1: Credit Default Swap (CDS) diagram (The Royal Bank of Scotland [49])
In brief, a typical CDS is a swap composed of a premium and a loss leg where a protection
buyer normally holds a defaultable security (e.g., a corporate bond) and buys protection
against credit default by paying a regular fee to a protection seller, as illustrated by the
diagram in Figure 2.1. In the case of a credit event, the loss leg is triggered and the protec-
tion seller pays the protection buyer the notional of the deal in exchange for the defaulted
∗The reader is referred to The Royal Bank of Scotland [49] and J.P. Morgan Securities [26] for a detailed
discussion of how credit default swaps work.
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security, after which the agreement ceases to exist. The protection seller is left with the
underlying defaulted security, from which part of the face value can be recovered after all
obligations with equity holders and senior debt holders are met by the obligor. Note that the
definition of credit events can be different in each CDS agreement, but typically follows the
ISDA (International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.) standards. Also, the fair or
par spread∗ of a CDS is computed as the spread that equalizes the present value of the loss
leg (expected cash flows generated by a credit event) to the present value of the cash flows
from the premium leg (regular spread payments). Market quotes of spreads of CDSs for
various obligors are widely available at par for a number of maturities, and for that reason
CDSs have become basic building blocks for the pricing of all credit derivatives through
the bootstrapping of probabilities of survival (or default) from market prices.
Figure 2.2: Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) diagram (The Royal Bank of Scot-
land [49])
Similarly to a CDS, the payoff agreement of a synthetic CDO provides protection against
credit events in the underlying portfolio in exchange for a regular fee payment. A CDO
in its synthetic form is also a swap agreement, as showed by the diagram in Figure 2.2.
However, the main difference is that synthetic CDOs consist of a waterfall structure to
divide the potential losses in the portfolio into specific levels of risk. It is divided into
swaps with different subordination levels, where the protection leg is triggered only if the
∗Note that the term spread is the market standard, but it may be misleading as in the case of CDSs it
represents a fixed fee payment as opposed to an actual spread over the prevailing interest rates.
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cumulative loss given default in the underlying portfolio reaches the attachment while being
limited by the detachment points of the structure. The attachment point defines the level
of cumulative loss from which the specific CDO tranche protection leg starts paying off
protection buyers for defaults in the portfolio. The notional of the CDO is dynamically
reduced by the amount of the loss as defaults continue beyond the attachment point and
until they reach the detachment point. The detachment point is therefore the level of the
cumulative loss in the underlying portfolio in which the notional of the CDO is zero, and
therefore the agreement ceases to exist.
In order to give an example, let the attachment point XL = 2% and the detachment point
XU = 5% define a synthetic CDO tranche based on a portfolio of 100 equally weighted
CDSs, with notional of d400 thousand each. Based on this, the total CDO portfolio no-
tional is d40 million, while the the notional of the tranche is 0.05− 0.02 = 0.03 times d40
million, or d1.2 million. As the protection starts at 2% and assuming a recovery rate of
50%, it takes exactly 4 credit events in the portfolio for the attachment point to be reached.
On the fifth credit event, the notional of the tranche is reduced to d1 million (given d200
thousand is lost and another d200 thousand is recovered) while the defaulted obligor is
written off from the portfolio. The protection buyer then receives the full notional of the
defaulted CDS (i.e., d400 thousand) while the protection seller is left with whatever is re-
coverable (i.e., d200 thousand) from the defaulted security∗. This process goes on for each
credit event, until five extra defaults wipe out the tranche.
Note that a portfolio of CDSs underlying a CDO structure resembles the assets of a balance
sheet, while the tranched structure replicates the liabilities. Thus, by convention CDO
tranches with subordination points between 0% and a certain x% are called equity tranches,
just as in the case of the shareholder’s equity piece of a corporate balance sheet. Any CDO
tranche defined between x% and a detachment point lower than 100% is called mezzanine
tranche, while senior or super senior tranches are the one defined from any point in the
structure up to 100%.
∗This is the case for an agreement with physical settlement, while cash settled agreements are also com-
mon.
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Figure 2.3: Standard tranches for iTraxx and CDX indices
The markets for synthetic CDOs have developed in such a way that standard portfolios and
tranches have emerged and are actively quoted by market participants. There are two main
standard portfolios or indices, the iTraxx Europe and the CDX North America. The iTraxx
is composed of 125 investment grade equally weighted European obligors while the CDX
is based on an equal number of North American obligors. Both iTraxx and CDX indices
have five standard tranches quoted in the market, as showed by the sample in Figure 2.3.
The pricing of such standard tranches is currently based on the Gaussian copula with base
correlations, as per discussion that follows.
2.1.2 The Gaussian copula model
The Gaussian copula model emerged in late 1990’s as the market standard for pricing port-
folio credit derivatives, having become well known through the articles [34] and [35] by
David Li. The model is not new, it is in fact a simplified form of earlier one-factor mod-
els by Vasicek [50] and almost identical to the original CreditMetrics model introduced by
Gupton et al [17]. However its breakthrough was the analogy established between credit
risk management techniques and portfolios of credit securities underlying market instru-
ments, with its consequent application to price portfolio credit derivatives.
The idea consists of a random variable time-until-default τ , which defines the expected
length of time it takes for an obligor to default. Each obligor m is then defined by its
marginal cumulative survival probability distribution Fm(T ) = 1 − P [τm ≤ T ], where T
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is the instrument’s horizon (typically the expiry of the agreement). Finally, a copula func-
tion is introduced to establish the dependence between each marginal distribution Fm(T ),
creating a full multivariate or joint distribution of the portfolio. This is represented from
Li [34] by
P [τ1 ≤ T, τ2 ≤ T, · · · , τM ≤ T ] = C(u1, u2, · · · , uM), (2.1)
where
um = 1− Fm(T ) = P [τm ≤ T ] (2.2)
are uniformly distributed random variables, resulting in
P [τ1 ≤ T, τ2 ≤ T, · · · , τM ≤ T ] = C(F1(T ), F2(T ), · · · , FM(T )). (2.3)
The copula function chosen by Li was the Gaussian copula which is essentially equivalent
to the cumulative normal multivariate probability distribution function, i.e.,
C(F1(T ), F2(T ), · · · , FM(T )) =
∫ A1
−∞
∫ A2
−∞
· · ·
∫ AM
−∞
1
(2pi)M/2|ρ|1/2 e
−vρ−1vdv1dv2 · · · dvM ,
(2.4)
where
Am = Φ
−1(1− Fm(T ))
and ρ is the correlation matrix and Φ is the cumulative normal probability distribution
function. A typical implementation of (2.4) is through a Monte Carlo simulation with Am
sampled by
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A = RZ ∼ Φ(0, ρ),
where Z are standard normal random variables and R is the Cholesky decomposition of
the correlation matrix (i.e., ρ = RtR). The time until default τm = F−1(1 − Φ(Am)) is
computed for each simulation path and if τm ≤ T , the obligor m is counted as defaulted on
that specific path.∗ Li [34] also proposed that the correlation between each obligor’s time
until default is equivalent to the asset correlation, i.e., the correlation between the balance
sheet assets of each obligor. As dynamic asset values of institutions are unobservable
directly, computing these correlations from time-series of assets derived from equity prices
became a common early practice as well as the use of equity prices correlation as proxy for
asset correlation.
Li’s approach is a general case of the application of copulas to credit portfolios and, as
pointed out by Laurent and Gregory [32], it is the dependence structure underlying Credit-
Metrics as well as the new Basel agreement. A particular case of this approach is associated
with a one factor representation introduced by Vasicek [50], which opened up implemen-
tation possibilities particularly interesting in the case of CDOs. Vasicek’s based his idea
on Merton’s model for the capital structure of firms, where the assets of an obligor are
assumed to follow a Geometric Brownian Motion. Given a credit portfolio of M obligors,
the approach states that an obligor m defaults if the value of its assets Am falls below a
certain barrier Hm, or Am < Hm. In this case the probability of default for that obligor is
given by
pm = Φ(Hm), (2.5)
while the central argument is that the value of the assets Am of each obligor m is given by
∗Scho¨nbucher [43] shows in detail the generation of sample paths for copulas in a general case.
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Am = y
√
βm + zm
√
1− βm (2.6)
where the random variable y is a common portfolio factor interpreted as the systematic risk
of the economic environment in which the obligors are inserted. On the other hand, each
zm is interpreted as the idiosyncratic or specific risk of each obligor m. The coefficient βm
is the correlation between each obligor’s zm and the common portfolio factor y, where y
and all zm are mutually independent normal standard random variables. Therefore, condi-
tional on the realization of the common factor y, each obligor’s assets as well as defaults
are independent. If (2.5) provides the unconditional probability of default for obligor m,
applying it to (2.6) for Am = Hm results in the conditional probability of default given as
pm(y) = Φ
(
Φ−1(pm)− y
√
βm√
1− βmy
)
. (2.7)
From this point on, Vasicek’s approach departs from the application of pricing credit port-
folio derivatives as market instruments. In Vasicek [51], the law of large numbers is applied
in order to derive the total portfolio loss conditional on y for n → ∞. Vasicek [52] shows
both cumulative and density loss probability distributions resulting from this large pool
assumption, only relevant for assessing large portfolios of loans and credit obligations in
financial institutions. However, (2.6) and (2.7) are still central to the development of the
various copula approaches and many structural models for portfolio credit derivatives. Fol-
lowing the argument that default events are independent conditional on the common factor
y, Laurent and Gregory [32] show that integrating over the common factor y in (2.7) results
in the cumulative joint loss distribution of the portfolio, given by
F (τ1, τ2, · · · , τM) =
∫ +∞
−∞
M∏
i=1
pi(y)f(y)dy
=
∫ +∞
−∞
M∏
m=1
Φ
(
Φ−1(Fm(τm))−
√
βm√
1− βm
y
)
f(y)dy,
(2.8)
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where f(y) is the standard normal density function. It can be showed that (2.8) is equivalent
to (2.4), a realization that has led to various implementation possibilities.
There are numerous standard convolution techniques that can be used to solve (2.8), e.g.
Fourier transforms, Laplace transforms, moment generating functions, etc. For instance,
NumeriX LLC [39] shows that (2.8) can be evaluated through simple convolution of the
marginal distributions, or by applying Fourier transforms subsequently solved through
quadrature techniques. Furthermore, NumeriX LLC [38] evaluates (2.8) analytically through
Laplace transforms applying the saddle point approximation on the cumulant generating
function, while Andersen et al [1] proposed a semi-analytical implementation that became
widely used in the industry. We now discuss how the Gaussian copula model is actually
applied by practitioners through the use of base correlations.
2.1.3 Gaussian copula and base correlations
Early applications of (2.8) for CDO pricing adopted the correlation approach previously
mentioned, i.e., asset correlations from time-series of equity prices or equity correlations
as proxies. However, with the standard iTraxx and CDX tranches becoming increasingly
liquid, it was evident that prices of CDOs computed with the Gaussian copula under these
correlation assumptions were not in line with quoted market prices. The zero tail depen-
dence from the Gaussian copula was immediately pointed out as one of the limitations for
applications of the Gaussian copula for portfolio credit derivatives. In order to improve on
the tail dependence, Mashal and Naldi [36] as well as Andersen et al [1] tried the t-copula,
while Scho¨nbucher [43] applied Archimedean copulas. However, none of these approaches
have significantly improved the matching of market quotes by the model. Burtschell et
al [7] show this by comparing market quotes of iTraxx tranches with prices computed by
the Gaussian copula, the t-copula and the Clayton copula (one of the most well known
Archimedean copula for credit portfolio applications).
It had become clear that copula functions based on historical calibration of dependence
parameters failed to provide a viable solution. Then market practitioners gradually adopted
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the practice of restricting the correlation in (2.6) to a single value across all obligors in the
portfolio as opposed to using pairwise correlation matrices, i.e., βm = β. Although this
assumption limits the range of possible correlation structures, it has the main benefit of
reducing the number of parameters required by the model. This resulted in more efficient
calibration and computation while giving a more intuitive meaning to the Gaussian copula
correlation as a representation of market prices. However, Burtschell et al [7] showed
that the single-correlation Gaussian copula also fails to match observed prices of tranches
for the iTraxx index. More specifically, they demonstrated that market quotes of iTraxx
tranches are consistent with a correlation smile. Computing the correlation parameter that
reproduces market quotes for each iTraxx tranche leads to the so called implied correlation
smile or compound correlation skew, in a similar fashion to the volatility smile concept
from option pricing where the parameter itself looses its original statistical meaning and
becomes simply a representation of market prices. Note the implied correlation showed by
the right chart of Figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Base and compound correlations (J.P. Morgan Securities [28])
The application of a correlation smile seemed to solve the market-model matching issue for
a single correlation Gaussian copula framework. However, a common problem with that is
the difficulty to imply correlations for non-standard tranches. Taking the iTraxx index as
an example, the correlation for a 5-7 tranche is not directly an interpolation of the correla-
tion curve from the standard tranches 3-6 and 6-9 in Figure 2.4. Furthermore, Finger [12]
pointed out that the implied correlation fails when applied to mezzanine tranches because
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either “ ...there are two correlation levels that reproduce the tranche pricing, or, more se-
riously, that no correlation level reproduces the tranche pricing.” An example of this is
showed in J.P. Morgan Securities [28], where the iTraxx 3-6 tranche spread can be mapped
into two different correlation levels, as illustrated in Figure 2.5. This is due to the fact
that a mezzanine tranche spread is not a monotonic function of the correlation parameter.
This indicates that “...we should utilize the constant correlation framework differently,” as
indicated by Finger [12].
Figure 2.5: Two solutions for mezzanine compound correlation (J.P. Morgan Securi-
ties [28])
The solution came with base correlations, which effectively map equivalent equity tranche
spreads directly into correlations in a monotonic relationship. The key is the idea that any
specific tranche can be represented as the difference between two equity tranches. For
instance, selling protection on a 3-6 iTraxx tranche is equivalent to buying protection in
the 0-3 and then selling protection on a fictitious 0-6 tranche. In this case, implying the
correlation from the 0-3 tranche leads to the one for the 0-6 tranche, and subsequently for
higher detachment points. A typical base correlation curve for the iTraxx index is shown by
the left chart in Figure 2.4. Note that besides solving the calibration issue with mezzanine
tranches, base correlations also provide a direct translation of correlations into spreads of
non-standard index tranches. For instance, in order to compute the par spread of a 2-5
tranche in the iTraxx, one is able to interpolate the base correlation curve in Figure 2.4 to
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find the correlations for 0-2 and 0-5 tranches, which can in turn be used to price the 2-5
tranche.
One clear flaw of the base correlation approach is the assumption made by the interpolation
technique. Linear interpolation is typically used, but other methods like polynomial and
cubic spline are also applied and provide different results. In addition to this, RISK [42]
pointed out that the base correlation approach “...is fundamentally flawed because in ar-
bitrage pricing theory there is a link between price and the unique dynamics imposed in
the model”, while base correlation “...cannot be linked to a unique choice of dynamics and
therefore the concept of price is weakened.” As indicated in that article, there is still a lot of
discomfort among academics and market players with the standard market model. We try
to address this issue by suggesting viable alternatives, but before that we move forward to
the next section where the CDO is represented mathematically through its payoff function.
2.1.4 The CDO payoff function
The previously discussed Gaussian copula model is one type of bottom-up approach for
pricing CDOs, where the loss probability distribution of a credit portfolio is constructed
from marginal loss probabilities of each obligor in the portfolio to form a multinomial
loss distribution through an assumed dependence structure. In this research we apply top-
down approaches for the pricing of CDOs, where the portfolio loss probability distribution
is modeled directly and calibrated through market prices. For that we define a random
variable xt which represents the cumulative loss of the underlying portfolio at a certain
horizon t, written as
xt =
M∑
m=1
(1− rm)ωmym(t), (2.9)
where M is the number of obligors, rm is the recovery rate and ωm is the weight of each
obligor m in the portfolio. Note that xt is in reality a discrete variable for every time t from
inception until expiry of the CDO agreement, as ym(t) is a Bernoulli variable representing
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the credit event by each obligor given by
ym(t) =
1 if τm > t0 if τm ≤ t , (2.10)
where τm is the time until default of obligor m. For every horizon t we assume that the ex-
pected value of ym(t) is known. In practice, this is accomplished by implying the expected
survival (or default) probabilities from the market quotes of CDSs for each obligor, where
E[ym(t)] = [1 − Ft(τm)] with Ft(τm) from (2.2) or ym(t) = Φ(Hm) in (2.5).∗ Equation
(2.9) shows that assuming rm and ωm as constants, xt is defined for every horizon t and
E[xt] =
M∑
m=1
(1− rm)ωmE[ym(t)] =
M∑
m=1
(1− rm)ωm[1− Ft(τm)]. (2.11)
Now consider a CDO with attachment point XU and detachment point XL. The cumulative
expected loss due to the subordination of such a tranche for every horizon t can be written
as
ε(t) = E
[
(min(xt, XU)−XL)+
]
, (2.12)
which is equivalent to
ε(t) = E
[
(xt −XL)+ − (xt −XU)+
]
, (2.13)
where (A)+ = max(A, 0).
We now refer to the CDO diagram of Figure 2.6, which indicates that the premium pay-
ments of a CDO agreement is divided into Nj payment dates such as {j = 1, · · · , Nj} for
∗The reader is referred to Scho¨nbucher [44] and Li [33] for details on the calibration of survival proba-
bilities from market quotes of CDSs.
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Figure 2.6: CDO discretization diagram for Entropy formulation and calibration
each of Nk possible tranches from zero to total loss in the portfolio. Although defaults in
the portfolio can happen at any point in time, it is useful to define the loss leg of the CDO
tranche in order to match the payment dates from the premium leg. Given (2.13), the loss
leg of the CDO can be written as
Nj∑
j=1
Bj
(
εkj − εk(j−1)
)
, (2.14)
where Bj is the discount factor at time tj and εkj is such that XU = Xk and XL = Xk−1 in
(2.12) and (2.13). Similarly, the premium leg can be defined by
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Sk
Nj∑
j=1
(tj − tj−1)BjE
[
(1− α)Ak(j−1) − αAkj
]
+ Uk(Xk −Xk−1),
where Sk is the spread paid on regular dates tj , Uk is an upfront premium payment, and
Akj is the notional of the tranche k at a certain point in time tj ≥ 0. Note that [tj − tj−1]
represents the time interval between two spread payment dates, and the parameter α takes
into account the accrued interest depending at which specific point in time between tj and
tj−1 a credit event happens. For instance, if α = 0.5 then loss is assumed to happen in
t =
tj − tj−1
2
+ tj−1.
Given that
Aj = Ak0 − εkj = Xk −Xk−1 − εkj and
Ak(j−1) = Ak0 − εk(j−1) = Xk −Xk−1 − εk(j−1)
where Ak0 is the notional of the tranche at inception of the agreement, the premium leg can
be rewritten as
Sk
Nj∑
j=1
(tj − tj−1)Bj
[
Xk −Xk−1 − (1− α)εk(j−1) − αεkj
]
+ Uk(Xk −Xk−1). (2.15)
The majority of synthetic CDO transactions happen on iTraxx and CDX indices, while
market quotes of tranches on these indices are given in pairs of par spread Sk and upfront
payment Uk such that
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Sk
Nj∑
j=1
(tj − tj−1)Bj
[
Xk −Xk−1 − (1− α)εk(j−1) − αεkj
]
+ Uk(Xk −Xk−1)
−
Nj∑
j=1
Bj
[
εkj − εk(j−1)
]
= 0,
(2.16)
where Uk is typically quoted as zero for mezzanine and senior tranches as shown in Fig-
ure 2.3. A further application of (2.16) is for CDOs on bespoke portfolios, i.e., CDOs with
CDS portfolios different from iTraxx and CDX. It becomes clear that the key to pricing
CDO tranche agreements for any attachment and detachment points relies on modeling ε
and in evaluating the expectation in (2.13). These are the topics of the two sections that
follow.
2.2 Johnson SB (JSB) approach
2.2.1 Introduction
In this section we propose the application of the JSB distribution discussed in section 1.1
for the modeling of a default loss random variable from a portfolio of institutional CDSs.
Due to the high degree of tractability of JSB distributions, we are able to achieve a semi-
analytical solution for the distribution of cumulative losses for each payment j from (2.14)
and (2.15). The hypothesis behind this approach is that JSB distributions should reasonably
match the actual loss distribution of a credit portfolio as the one showed by J.P. Morgan
Securities [28] and illustrated in Figure 2.7.
The idea is to adopt a top-down approach by modeling directly the distribution of the the to-
tal portfolio losses. This is accomplished by directly fitting the distribution of xt from (2.9)
through a JSB distribution. The development of this hypothesis into an analytical formula
for pricing CDOs is performed in this section. We start by matching the characteristics of
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Figure 2.7: Implied loss distribution of a CDO’s underlying portfolio (J.P. Morgan Securi-
ties [28])
the random variable xt and show it can be represented by a JSB distribution, followed by
the application of the CDO payoff.
2.2.2 Formulation
The idea is to have an analytic or semi-analytic solution for the pricing of CDOs by apply-
ing one of the Johnson transformations to xt. Note that the cumulative loss xt is a bounded
random variable, which makes the JSB system an obvious alternative to fit a parametric
distribution for xt. In this case, each slice in time t will have a different set of parameters
that will fit (1.2c), i.e,
zt = at + bt log
xt − ct
dt + ct − xt . (2.17)
For a portfolio of M names, the lower bound is zero while the upper bound is given by
XM ≤ 1 given the recovery rate is rm ≥ 0 for each obligor m in the portfolio. Note that
XM = 1 only if all rm = 0, and xt = XM when all ym(t) = 1 in (2.10), establishing the
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relation
XM =
M∑
m=1
(1− rm)ωm. (2.18)
As a result, both ct = 0 and dt = XM for all t in (2.17) given ct ≤ xt ≤ ct + dt, and that
the minimum possible portfolio loss is zero. Thus,
zt = at + bt log
xt
XM − xt . (2.19)
It follows from (2.12) that εt can be decomposed as∗
ε(t) =
∫ XM
0
(xt −XL)f(xt)dxt
−
∫ XL
0
(xt −XL)f(xt)dxt −
∫ XM
XU
(xt −XU)f(xt)dxt,
where f(xt) is the probability density distribution of xt. Now make ε(t) = A − B − C
where†
A =
∫ XM
0
(xt −XL)f(xt)dxt = E[xt]−XL,
B =
∫ XL
0
(xt −XL)f(xt)dxt = −
∫ XL
0
JSB(xt)dxt
and
∗Proof in Appendix A.3.
†Proof in Appendix A.4.
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C =
∫ XM
XU
(xt −XU)f(xt)dxt = XM −XU −
∫ XM
XU
JSB(xt)dxt,
with
JSB(xt) =
∫ xt
0
f(u)du.
This result leads to
ε(t) = E[xt]−XM +XU −XL +
∫ XL
0
JSB(xt)dxt +
∫ XM
XU
JSB(xt)dxt. (2.20)
Key now is to solve for JSB(xt), where we define
ψ(y) =
1√
2pi
∫ y
−∞
e−
v2
2
1 + e
at−v
bt
dv, (2.21)
and arrive at a solution given in Appendix A.5 as
ε(t) = E[xt] +XU [1− Φ(K(XU))]−XL[1− Φ(K(XL))]
+XM [ψ(K(XU))− ψ(K(XL))− ψ(K(XM))].
(2.22)
The final solution for ε(t) can be achieved by applying some boundary conditions. Note
that ifXL = 0 andXU ≤ XM , the CDO tranche is equivalent to the whole underlying port-
folio. In this case, ε(t) must equal the expected value of xt. This can be better understood
by testing it with (2.12), as follows
ε(t) = E[(min(xt, XU)−XL)+] = E[(min(xt, XM)− 0)+]⇒
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ε(t) =
∫ XM
0
xtf(xt)dxt = E[xt].
In this case we have
XL = 0⇒ K(0) = −∞
and
XU = XM ⇒ K(XM) = +∞.
We can test it now by applying it back into (2.22), which results in
ε(t) = E[xt] +XM [1− Φ(K(XM))]− 0[1− Φ(K(0))]
+XM [ψ(K(XM))− ψ(K(0))− ψ(K(XM))]⇒
ε(t) = E[xt] +XM [1− Φ(+∞)]− 0[1− Φ(−∞)]
+XM [ψ(+∞)− ψ(−∞)− ψ(+∞)]⇒
ε(t) = E[xt]
given that Φ(+∞) = 1, Φ(−∞) = 0 and ψ(−∞) = 0.
Thus, the solution in (2.22) has passed the first boundary condition. The second boundary
condition is the case where the CDO has zero notional, i.e., the attachment and detachment
points are the same. We assess intuitively that if XL = XU = XA then ε(t) = 0 for all t as
the CDO is not exposed to any risk of a credit default. This fictitious case can be seen by
testing it with (2.12) as
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ε(t) = E[(min(xt, XU)−XL)+] = E[(min(xt, XA)−XA)+] = 0.
Once again we test it by applying it back into (2.22), i.e.,
ε(t) = E[xt] +XA[1− Φ(K(XA))]−XA[1− Φ(K(XA))]
+XM [ψ(K(XA))− ψ(K(XA))− ψ(K(XM))]⇒
ε(t) = E[xt]−XM [ψ(K(XM))].
The only possible situation for ε(t) is if E[xt] = XM [ψ(K(XM))]. From the Johnson
transformation (1.2c) we have that
xt
XM
=
(
1 + e
at−z
bt
)−1
,
and thus in the case of K(XM)
ψ(K(XM)) = E
[
xt
XM
]
=
1
XM
E[xt].
Substituting this result back into ε(t) yields
ε(t) = E[xt]− XM
XM
E[xt] = 0,
which proves that the solution respects the second boundary condition.
We can now write ε(t) in the form
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KU = K(at, bt, XU) = at + bt log
XU
XM −XU , (2.23a)
KL = K(at, bt, XL) = at + bt log
XL
XM −XL , (2.23b)
ε(t) = XU [1− Φ(KU)]− L[1− Φ(KL)] +XM [ψ(KU)− ψ(KL)], (2.23c)
ψ(KU) =
1√
2pi
∫ KU
−∞
e−
v2
2
1 + e
at−v
bt
dv, (2.23d)
ψ(KL) =
1√
2pi
∫ KL
−∞
e−
v2
2
1 + e
at−v
bt
dv. (2.23e)
One note remains on evaluating (2.21), which must be performed numerically. We can
apply Goodwin’s quadrature formula from section 1.3, where from (2.21) we identify f(x)
in (1.21) as
f(x)dx =
1√
2pi
(
1 + e
at−v
bt
)−1
dv,
given from section 1.1 that (1.3c) maps into the standard normal density and that
xt =
[
c+ d
(
1 + e
at−v
bt
)]−1
from the JSB transformation (1.2c) for z = v. Note that f(x) → 1 as x → +∞ and
f(x) → 0 as x → −∞ given a is finite and b > 0, thus a suitable function for application
of Goodwin’s method. By neglecting the error term and making x =
√
2u with u = nh,
we change ψ to
ψ(x) =
h√
pi
Nx∑
n=−∞
(
1 + e
at−
√
2nh
bt
)−1
e−n
2h2 , (2.24)
where Nx can be chosen accordingly so that Nxh matches Kx as the upper bound of the
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integral.
Goodwin’s method applies well to the case of ψ(x), but one needs to be cautious to use
it in a production environment due to performance issues. Appendix A.1 compares the
application of Goodwin’s formula to ψ(x) with a the Gauss-Kronrod quadrature. While
the result of the actual integral is satisfactory, clearly the application of Goodwin’s method
may be only be justified for research purposes. With that in mind, we propose the final
solution of our formulation, given by
KU = K(at, bt, XU) = at + bt log
XU
XM −XU , (2.25a)
KL = K(at, bt, XL) = at + bt log
XL
XM −XL , (2.25b)
ε(t) = XU [1− Φ(KU)]− L[1− Φ(KL)] +XM [ψ(KU)− ψ(KL)], (2.25c)
ψ(at, bt, XU) =
h√
pi
NU∑
n=−∞
(
1 + e
at−
√
2nh
bt
)−1
e−n
2h2 , KU = NUh, (2.25d)
ψ(at, bt, XL) =
h√
pi
NL∑
n=−∞
(
1 + e
at−
√
2nh
bt
)−1
e−n
2h2 , KL = NLh. (2.25e)
We now apply the concepts and equations from this section in the discussion that follows
on model parameter calibration.
2.2.3 Calibration
The first thing to note from the previous formulation is that
ψ(XM) =
h√
pi
+∞∑
n=−∞
(
1 + e
at−
√
2nh
bt
)−1
e−n
2h2 =
1
XM
E[xt], (2.26)
as determined in the test of the second boundary conditions. From the CDO discretiza-
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tion shown in Figure 2.6, (2.26) provides a set of {j = 1, · · · , Nj} equations to be used
in the calibration, where ψj(XM) = E[xj]/XM is the expected value of the cumulative
portfolio loss at tj per unit of the total possible loss XM . The expectation E[xj] can be
implied from market quotes of CDS spreads for each obligor as discussed in section 2.1.2,
which together with ψj(XM) provides the first minimization condition of the calibration.
If Fmj = 1 − P [τm ≤ tj] is the probability of survival∗ with τm as the time until default,
rm is the recovery rate and Nm is the notional amount for the CDS of obligor m, the ex-
pected cumulative portfolio loss at time tj in proportion to the total portfolio notional NM
is defined as
E[xj] =
M∑
m=1
(1− rm)NmNM (1− Fmj). (2.27)
This leads to the set of objective functions
F1(aj, bj) =∣∣∣∣∣XMh√pi
+∞∑
n=−∞
(
1 + e
aj−
√
2nh
bj
)−1
e−n
2h2 −
M∑
m=1
(1− rm)NmNM (1− Fmj)
∣∣∣∣∣
2 (2.28)
to be applied for each j in a least-square minimization method.
The other set of equations come from the tranche payoff introduced in section 2.1.4, where
parameters are typically calibrated against CDX and iTraxx tranche prices. In the case of
the JSB approach, we leave out the basket spread defined for subordination points 0-100 as
this quantifies the expected loss in the whole portfolio which is already taken into account
by (2.28). However, there are Nk tranche equations plus Nj expected loss equations (2.28),
while the problem contains 2Nj variables (aj and bj for {j = 1, · · · , Nj}). Given 2Nj >
Nj + Nk and in order to avoid working with an underdetermined system of equations, it
∗More details on bootstrapping probabilities of survival from CDS quotes can be found in
Scho¨nbucher [44] and Li [33].
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is useful to establish a functional form for either aj or bj . Given aj acts like the mean
parameter of a probability distribution in the JSB transformation of (1.2c), we choose to
define bj as a polynomial function of time∗, i.e.,
bj =
Nk∑
k=1
βk−1tk−1j . (2.29)
We can now write the final set of nonlinear equations from (2.16), given by
g(k, aj, bj) =
Sk
Nj∑
j=1
(tj − tj−1)Bj[Xk −Xk−1
−(1− α)εk(j−1)(aj−1, bj−1)− αεkj(aj, bj)] + Uk(Xk −Xk−1)
−
Nj∑
j=1
Bj
[
εkj(aj, bj)− εk(j−1)(aj−1, bj−1)
]
,
F2(aj, bj) =
Nk∑
k=1
g(k, aj, bj)
2.
(2.30)
where εkj(aj, bj) is defined in (2.25c).
Numerical methods such as Newton-Raphson can be used to minimize (2.28) and (2.30),
while the calibration procedure can be established as follows:
1. Start with an initial guess on the values of βk−1 from (2.29).
2. For each j, compute bj through (2.29).
3. For each j, minimize F1(aj, bj) in (2.28) for aj .
4. Compute (2.30) given aj and bj for {j = 1, · · · , Nj}.
∗See Appendix A.2 for an alternative method.
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5. If F2(aj, bj) ≤ TOL, calibration is complete. Otherwise, change βk−1 and go back to
step 2.
Once the calibration with index tranches (iTraxx or CDX) is performed, a useful further
application is to calibrate the model to bespoke portfolios. However, the only information
available for this task is the cumulative expected loss E[xj] for the new portfolio, boot-
strapped from CDS spreads as previously discussed in the cases of iTraxx and CDX. Thus,
we need to make the assumption of keeping bj and recalibrating aj for every j given E[xj]
and (2.28). In this case the calibration steps are as follows:
1. Calibrate aj and bj according to previous steps for iTraxx or CDX tranches.
2. Make the previous aj as initial guess and keep the values of bj .
3. For each j, minimize (2.28) for aj with {j = 1, · · · , Nj}, where the calibration is
complete after j = Nj .
2.3 Entropy optimization approach
2.3.1 Introduction
The application of entropy optimization techniques in finance is not new. Avellaneda et
al [2] poposed the application of the relative entropy minimization to calibrate volatility
surfaces in Dollar-Deutschemark options, while later on Goldman Sachs[15] applied the
concept to estimate a fair volatility smile of equity options from the time-series of the
underlying stock’s historical returns. Here we propose a similar application of entropy
optimization for modeling the loss due to default from an underlying portfolio of CDSs, and
consequently use calibrated Langrange multipliers and probabilities to price CDO tranches.
We start by formulating the approach, followed by a description of how we use it in the
calibration process.
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2.3.2 Formulation
We now apply the entropy optimization concepts of section 1.2 in the pricing of CDOs.
Recognizing that loss given default in the underlying credit portfolio is the driver behind
CDO prices and that it is in reality a discrete variable, we take particular interest in Kull-
back’s relative entropy definition of (1.13). Then the very first step in formulating this
approach is to make a suitable representation of the problem by means of discretizing the
underlying variable and events. This is shown graphically by Figure 2.6, where xi repre-
sents the discretization of the loss given default in the portfolio with {xi = 0, · · · , xNi} and
xNi = 1. Each default in the portfolio leads to a loss that can be realized at any point in time
until expiry of the CDO agreement. In that case, time is discretized by {j = 1, · · · , Nj},
where j defines the spread payment dates on the synthetic CDO swap. The problem is
then reduced to minimizing the relative entropy of (1.13) conditional to a set of underlying
constraints, i.e.,
min

Nj∑
j=1
Ni∑
i=1
pji log
pji
qji
 , (2.31)
conditional on the normalization constraint
Ni∑
i=1
pji − 1 = 0, {j = 1, · · · , Nj} (2.32)
and to the functional constraints
Sk
Nj∑
j=1
Bj∆j
[
Xk −Xk−1 − αεkj − (1− α)εk(j−1)
]
−
Nj∑
j=1
Bj
[
εkj − εk(j−1)
]− Uk(Xk −Xk−1) = 0,
{k = 0, · · · , Nk}, X−1 = 0,
(2.33)
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where ∆t = tj − tj−1 and
εkj =
Ni∑
i=1
(xi −Xk−1)+pji −
Ni∑
i=1
(xi −Xk)+pji, (2.34)
with the functional constraints coming from the CDO tranche payoff in (2.16). In the
case of an entropy optimization problem for pricing CDOs, these constraints effectively
define the information available given CDO tranche market quotes on credit indices as
discussed in section 2.1.1. In this case, Sk and Uk are respectively the market quoted
spread and upfront payment required for tranche k, while Xk and Xk−1 are respectively
the detachment and attachment points. In addition, (2.34) is simply a discretized version
of (2.13) also discussed in section 2.1.1, while again α defines the point in time in which
default happens between payment dates (typically assumed as 0.5).
We can now apply the steps described in section 1.2, by first writing the Lagrangian as
L =
Nj∑
j=1
Ni∑
i=1
pji log pji −
Nj∑
j=1
Ni∑
i=1
pji log qji
+
Nj∑
j=1
(µj − 1)
(
Ni∑
i=1
pji − 1
)
+
Nk∑
k=1
λkfk,
(2.35)
where fk is given by
fk = Sk
Nj∑
j=1
Bj∆j[Xk −Xk−1 − αεkj − (1− α)εk(j−1)]
−
nkj∑
j=1
Bj[εkj − εk(j−1)]− Uk(Xk −Xk−1),
{k = 0, · · · , Nk}, X−1 = 0,
(2.36)
and εkj defined by (2.34) as a function of pji. Differentiating L with respect to pji and
setting it to zero results in
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∂L
∂pba
= 0 =
Nj∑
j=1
Ni∑
i=1
δiaδjb log pji +
Nj∑
j=1
Ni∑
i=1
δiaδjb −
Nj∑
j=1
Ni∑
i=1
δiaδjb log qji
+
Nj∑
j=1
(µj − 1)
Ni∑
i=1
δiaδjb +
Nk∑
k=1
λk
∂fk
∂pba
,
(2.37)
where
∂fk
∂pba
=
−Sk
Nj∑
j=1
Bj∆j
[
α
∂εkj
∂pba
+ (1− α)∂εk(j−1)
∂pba
]
−
Nj∑
j=1
Bj
[
∂εkj
∂pba
− ∂εk(j−1)
∂pba
]
,
(2.38)
∂εkj
∂pba
=
Ni∑
i=1
(xi −Xk−1)+δiaδjb −
Ni∑
i=1
(xi −Xk)+δiaδjb,
δab =
1 if a = b0 if a 6= b .
Note that the filtering function δ(i−1)a = 1 only if i − 1 = a or i = a + 1, while δia = 1
for i = a. Similarly, δ(j−1)b = 1 only if j = b + 1 while δjb = 1 for j = b. We can now
rearrange (2.38) to
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∂fk
∂pba
= −Sk
Nj∑
j=1
Bb∆bα[(xa −Xk−1)+ − (xa −Xk)+]δiaδjb
−Sk
Nj∑
j=1
Bb∆b(1− α)[(xa −Xk−1)+ − (xa −Xk)+]δiaδ(j−1)b
−
Nj∑
j=1
Bb[(xa −Xk−1)+ − (xa −Xk)+]δiaδjb
+
Nj∑
j=1
Bb[(xa −Xk−1)+ − (xa −Xk)+]δiaδ(j−1)b,
and apply the filtering property of the δ function to obtain
∂fk
∂pji
=
[
(xi −Xk−1)+ − (xi −Xk)+
]
×{Bj+1[1− (1− α)Sk∆j+1]−Bj(1 + αSk∆j)} .
(2.39)
Similarly, we can rewrite (2.37) as
log pji − log qji + 1 + (µj − 1) +
Nk∑
k=1
λk
∂fk
∂pji
= 0,
resulting in pji defined by
pji = qji exp
(
−µj −
Nk∑
k=1
λk
∂fk
∂pji
)
.
The next step is to extract µj by applying this equation to (2.32), where we write
exp(µj) =
Ni∑
m=1
qjm exp
(
−
Nk∑
k=1
λk
∂fk
∂pjm
)
, (2.40)
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leading to the solution for pji as
pji =
qji exp
(
−∑Nkk=1 λk ∂fk∂pji)∑Ni
m=1 qjm exp
(
−∑Nkk=1 λk ∂fk∂pjm) . (2.41)
Finally, applying (2.41) to (2.34) results in
εkj =
Ni∑
i=1
(xi −Xk−1)+
qji exp
(
−∑Nkk=1 λk ∂fk∂pji)∑Ni
m=1 qjm exp
(
−∑Nkk=1 λk ∂fk∂pjm)
−
Ni∑
i=1
(xi −Xk)+
qji exp
(
−∑Nkk=1 λk ∂fk∂pji)∑Ni
m=1 qjm exp
(
−∑Nkk=1 λk ∂fk∂pjm) .
(2.42)
This equation is then used to substitute εkj in the constraint equations (2.33), resulting in a
system of Nk nonlinear equations to be solved for Nk Lagrange multipliers λk.
The above steps are useful to compute Lagrange multipliers and consequently the proba-
bility surface defined in Ni by Nj points, specifically for the portfolio underlying the CDO
market quotes given as constraints. For instance, in the case of the iTraxx index discussed
in section 2.1.1, the spreads and upfront payments quotes of six tranches plus the basket
swap in the three standard expiries of 5y, 7y and 10y should be exactly matched by apply-
ing the probability surface computed by (2.41) to the constraints (2.33). Depending on the
discretization adopted for xi, a useful application of this probability surface is in computing
fair prices of CDO agreements in bespoke tranches for any maturity up to 10y based on the
iTraxx portfolio.
However, a common and even more useful application of this method is for CDO agree-
ments on bespoke underlying portfolios, as discussed previously in section 2.2.3. The
premise is to achieve a new set of Lagrange multipliers and consequently a new probability
surface pji given the cumulative expected loss of the portfolio for each {j = 1, ..., Nj}
as the only information available about the new portfolio. Fortunately in the case of the
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entropy approach, the pji found for iTraxx and CDX provide a reference measure regard-
ing the dependence structure of credit portfolios and can be used as prior distribution in an
entropy minimization problem. We achieve this be simply defining a new constraint as
Ni∑
i=1
xipji − cj = 0,
{j = 1, ..., Nj},
(2.43)
where cj is the portfolio cumulative expected loss defined as in (2.27) for a portfolio with
M obligors. The new Lagrangian is then given as
L =
Nj∑
j=1
Ni∑
i=1
pji log pji −
Nj∑
j=1
Ni∑
i=1
pji log qji
+
Nj∑
j=1
γj
(
Ni∑
i=1
xipji − cj
)
,
(2.44)
where qji is the probability surface found for iTraxx and CDX used here as a prior distribu-
tion. We follow the same previous steps to arrive at the pji equation for the new portfolio,
given by
pji =
qji exp (−γjxi)∑Ni
m=1 qjm exp (−γjxm)
. (2.45)
This can now be applied to (2.43) to generate a nonlinear system of Nj equations with Nj
unknowns given as
Ni∑
i=1
xiqji exp (−γjxi)∑Ni
m=1 qjm exp (−γjxm)
− cj = 0
{j = 1, ..., Nj}.
(2.46)
By integrating (2.46) in respect to γj , we can alternatively define a potential function
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G(γj) =
Nj∑
j=1
log
(
Ni∑
i=1
qji exp (−γjxi)
)
+
Nj∑
j=1
γjcj , (2.47)
that can be minimized for γj .
2.3.3 Calibration
Following the discretization defined by Figure 2.6, there are Nk + 1 tranche equations for
Nn different expiries. In the case of iTraxx or CDX, there are six tranches (i.e., Nk = 6)
plus the basket spread (i.e., k = 0 for 0-100 subordination) for three different expiries
(i.e., Nn = 3). Spread payments are made at specific dates defined by j, where {j =
1, · · · , Nj(n)} andNj(n) is a function of the tranche’s expiry defined by {n = 1, · · · , Nn}.
This provides the background to our first calibration approach, where we establish
Sk
Nj(n)∑
j=1
Bj∆j
(
Xk −Xk−1 − αεkj − (1− α)εk(j−1)
)
−
Nj(n)∑
j=1
Bj
(
εkj − εk(j−1)
)− Uk(Xk −Xk−1) = 0,
{k = 0, · · · , Nk}, {n = 1, · · · , Nn},
(2.48)
as the functional constraints previously discussed in section 2.3.2. In this approach, a set
of λk(n) parameters are calibrated sequentially for each of the Nn expiries in (2.48). This
consists of an iterative procedure where we apply pji(n− 1) and λk(n− 1) calibrated from
the n− 1 expiry in order to compute λk(n) and calculate the probabilities for the n expiry
(i.e., Nj(n− 1) + 1 ≤ j ≤ Nj(n)). In this case, by making
qji =
1
Ni
as the uniform distribution, we change (2.41) to
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pji(n) =
exp
(
−∑Nkk=1 λk(n) ∂fk∂pji)∑Ni
m=1 exp
(
−∑Nkk=1 λk(n) ∂fk∂pjm) . (2.49)
In each iteration n, the Nk constraint equations become
SkAn−1 − Bn−1
+Sk
Nj(n)∑
j=Nj(n−1)+1
Bj∆j
[
Xk −Xk−1 − αεkj(n)− (1− α)εk(j−1)(n)
]
−
Nj(n)∑
j=Nj(n−1)+1
Bj
[
εkj(n)− εk(j−1)(n)
]− Uk(Xk −Xk−1) = 0,
{k = 0, · · · , Nk}, {n = 1, · · · , Nn}, A0 = B0 = Nj(0) = 0,
(2.50)
where An−1 and Bn−1 are known from iteration n− 1 as
An−1 =
Nj(n−1)∑
j=Nj(n−2)+1
Bj∆j
[
Xk −Xk−1 − αεkj(pji(n− 1))− (1− α)εk(j−1)(pji(n− 1))
]
,
Bn−1 =
Nj(n−1)∑
j=Nj(n−2)
Bj
[
εkj(pji(n− 1))− εk(j−1)(pji(n− 1))
]
,
{n = 2, · · · , Nn}, Nj(0) = 0,
(2.51)
and εkj(n) is given by substituting (2.49) into (2.34) as
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εkj(n) =
Ni∑
i=1
(xi −Xk−1)+
exp
(
−∑Nkk=1 λk(n) ∂fk∂pji)∑Ni
m=1 exp
(
−∑Nkk=1 λk(n) ∂fk∂pjm)
−
Ni∑
i=1
(xi −Xk)+
exp
(
−∑Nkk=1 λk(n) ∂fk∂pji)∑Ni
m=1 exp
(
−∑Nkk=1 λk(n) ∂fk∂pjm) .
(2.52)
A second possible approach involves a recursive procedure based on the entropy minimiza-
tion and the concept of new information arrival discussed in section 1.2. We start just as in
the previous approach, by calibratingNk parameters λk for step n = 1. But then in the next
step n = 2 we use pji(1) from the previous step as a prior distribution qji in the relative
entropy minimization equation of (2.31), and calibrate another 2Nk parameters given now
we have Nk equations in respect of expiry n = 1 plus Nk equations for expiry n = 2. This
process is subsequently repeated until n = Nn, changing (2.41) to
pji(n) =
pji(n− 1) exp
(
−∑ns=1∑Nkk=1 λk(s) ∂fk∂pji)∑Ni
m=1 pjm(n− 1) exp
(
−∑ns=1∑Nkk=1 λk(s) ∂fk∂pjm)
{n = 1, · · · , Nn}, pji(0) = 1
Ni
.
(2.53)
In this case the constraints equations are still given by (2.50) with An−1 and Bn−1 from
(2.51), while εkj(n) changes to
εkj(n) =
Ni∑
i=1
(xi −Xk−1)+
pji(n− 1) exp
(
−∑ns=1∑Nkk=1 λk(s) ∂fk∂pji)∑Ni
m=1 pjm(n− 1) exp
(
−∑ns=1∑Nkk=1 λk(s) ∂fk∂pjm)
−
Ni∑
i=1
(xi −Xk)+
pji(n− 1) exp
(
−∑ns=1∑Nkk=1 λk(s) ∂fk∂pji)∑Ni
m=1 pjm(n− 1) exp
(
−∑ns=1∑Nkk=1 λk(s) ∂fk∂pjm) .
(2.54)
These two methods are equivalent and must converge to the solution. However, the second
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method is computationally more expensive and should be used in the cases of arbitrageable
and incoherent market quotes where computations for one tranche equation might con-
tradict another. We will adopt the first method given its simplicity and the high level of
liquidity of CDO index tranches in the market. In this case the calibration procedure is
given as follows:
1. Start with iteration n = 1, define Ni discretization and pji(0) = 1/Ni.
2. Solve (2.50) for λk(n) by computing pji through (2.49) for {j = Nj(n−1)+1, · · · , Nj(n)}
and using pji(n− 1) defined up to Nj(n− 1).
3. If n = Nn, calibration is complete. Otherwise, make n = n+ 1 and go back to step 2.
We also define the calibration steps for bespoke portfolios according to the discussion in
section 2.3.2, which consists in simply solving the system of Nj nonlinear equations in
(2.46) given pji from the previous steps for CDO index tranches as prior distribution. In
this case, the calibration steps are:
1. Compute pji according to previous steps for iTraxx or CDX tranches.
2. Compute cj through (2.27).
3. Either solve (2.46) or minimize (2.47) for γj where {j = 1, · · · , Nj(Nn)}, after which
calibration is complete.
2.4 Application
In this section we apply the JSB and Entropy approaches formulated in sections 2.2 and
2.3 to a practical CDO pricing case. The first step is to calibrate the cumulative loss prob-
abilities that are used for evaluating the CDO payoff of (2.16). For that we choose the
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iTraxx Europe Series 6 portfolio∗, where market quotes as of 15-Mar-2007 are used in the
calibration and are shown by Table 2.1. The iTraxx quotes are based on quarterly payment
schedules according to the IMM maturities† and are provided for 5y, 7y and 10y expiries.
Also, they come in six tranche subordinations 0-3, 3-6, 6-9, 9-12, 12-22 and 22-100 plus
one quote for the basket spread representing subordination 0-100. Given that the possibility
of defaults in the portfolio increases with time, spreads and upfront payments demanded by
the market are higher for longer expiry dates. In addition, note that due to its higher prob-
ability of being wiped out, the market demands for equity tranche 0-3 an upfront payment
as a percentage of its notional amount while quoting its spread at a fixed 500 bps (basis
points).
In the calibration process for both JSB and Entropy approaches, the time dimension j in
the diagram of Figure 2.6 is discretized according to iTraxx’s quarterly payment schedules,
where tj − tj−1 ≈ 0.25 years depending on each specific IMM maturity date. We define
Nn = 3 with n = 1 for expiry 5y, n = 2 for 7y and n = 3 for 10y, while Nj(1) = 20,
Nj(2) = 28 and Nj(3) = 40 given quarterly payment schedules. From the available iTraxx
information, we define Nk = 6 where k = 0 represents the 0-100 subordination. In the
case of the JSB approach, the iTraxx Europe Series 6 cumulative expected loss for each j is
calculated using (2.27), where probabilities of survival are extracted from the CDS quotes
of the obligors in the portfolio available from Appendix A.6. In the case of the Entropy
approach, the portfolio loss dimension i is discretized in steps of 1%. For the minimization
of objective functions (2.28) and (2.30) in the JSB approach we use the function fmincon
from Matlab, which implements the sequential quadratic programming method described
by Fletcher and Powell [13] and Goldfarb [14]. In the case of solving the nonlinear system
of equations (2.50) and (2.46) in the Entropy approach we use the function fsolve from
Matlab, which implements a Gauss-Newton nonlinear least-squares algorithm as described
by Dennis [8].
∗Appendix A.6 shows the composition of the iTraxx Series 6 portfolio with the respective CDS spread
curves of its constituents as of 15-Mar-2007.
†The IMM maturities define the cycle of dates used by the International Monetary Market at the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, i.e., 20-Mar, 20-Jun, 20-Sep and 20-Dec.
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(a) Market quotes for 5y iTraxx CDO tranches
Bid Ask Mid
Tranche Spread Upfront Spread Upfront Spread Upfront
(%) (bps) (%) (bps) (%) (bps) (%)
0-3 500.0000 11.7500 500.0000 12.0000 500.0000 11.8750
3-6 53.7500 - 55.2500 - 54.5000 -
6-9 14.0000 - 15.5000 - 14.7500 -
9-12 5.7500 - 6.7500 - 6.2500 -
12-22 2.1250 - 2.8750 - 2.5000 -
22-100 0.9000 - 1.4000 - 1.1500 -
0-100 25.0000 - - - - -
(b) Market quotes for 7y iTraxx CDO tranches
Bid Ask Mid
Tranche Spread Upfront Spread Upfront Spread Upfront
(%) (bps) (%) (bps) (%) (bps) (%)
0-3 500.0000 26.7500 500.0000 27.0000 500.0000 26.8750
3-6 130.5000 - 132.5000 - 131.5000 -
6-9 36.7500 - 38.2500 - 37.500 -
9-12 16.5000 - 18.0000 - 17.2500 -
12-22 5.5000 - 6.5000 - 6.0000 -
22-100 2.6000 - 3.1000 - 2.8500 -
0-100 34.0000 - - - - -
(c) Market quotes for 10y iTraxx CDO tranches
Bid Ask Mid
Tranche Spread Upfront Spread Upfront Spread Upfront
(%) (bps) (%) (bps) (%) (bps) (%)
0-3 500.0000 41.8750 500.0000 42.1250 500.0000 42.0000
3-6 347.0000 - 352.0000 - 349.5000 -
6-9 93.0000 - 95.0000 - 94.0000 -
9-12 40.0000 - 42.0000 - 41.0000 -
12-22 13.2500 - 14.2500 - 13.7500 -
22-100 4.4000 - 4.9000 - 4.6500 -
0-100 45.0000 - - - - -
Table 2.1: Market quotes for iTraxx CDO tranches
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(a) 5y
Tranche Spread (bps)
(%) Market Entropy JSB
0-3 500.0000 500.0002 686.4862
3-6 54.5000 54.5001 54.4702
6-9 14.7500 14.7500 14.8244
9-12 6.2500 6.2500 6.1877
12-22 2.5000 2.5000 3.1182
22-100 1.1500 1.1500 0.5728
0-100 25.0000 25.0000 25.6513
(b) 7y
Tranche Spread (bps)
(%) Market Entropy JSB
0-3 500.0000 500.0000 867.3606
3-6 131.5000 131.5000 131.4007
6-9 37.5000 37.5000 38.1782
9-12 17.2500 17.2500 16.0135
12-22 6.0000 6.0000 7.9422
22-100 2.8500 2.8500 1.3184
0-100 34.0000 34.0000 34.8828
(c) 10y
Tranche Spread (bps)
(%) Market Entropy JSB
0-3 500.0000 499.9985 1,046.4090
3-6 349.5000 349.4997 350.0946
6-9 94.0000 94.0000 96.1824
9-12 41.0000 41.0000 35.0908
12-22 13.7500 13.7500 15.0462
22-100 4.6500 4.6500 1.6874
0-100 45.0000 44.9999 45.2162
Table 2.2: Results for iTraxx Europe Series 6 CDO tranches as of 15-Mar-2007
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(a) 5y
(b) 7y
(c) 10y
Figure 2.8: Calibrated loss density probability distributions for 5y, 7y and 10y
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(a) 5y
(b) 7y
(c) 10y
Figure 2.9: Calibrated loss cumulative probability distributions for 5y, 7y and 10y under
Entropy and JSB
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With all input parameters and methods defined, we then apply the procedures described
in section 2.2.3 for the JSB approach and in section 2.3.3 for the Entropy approach. We
perform the calibration and then reprice the iTraxx tranches in order to compare the cal-
culated results against market quotes, as shown by Table 2.2. While the JSB calibration
is straightforward, the entropy calibration is not as easy and it took major effort to get it
right. Given the size of the optimization problem and limitations of the Gauss-Newton
nonlinear least-squares algorithm in Matlab’s fsolve function, it took several trials to reach
a version of the calibration procedure that would converge and not crash the program. By
splitting the calibration procedure into three smaller procedures (for the three CDO tenors),
the method described in section 2.3.3 was the one that converged to a satisfactory solution.
Given that, the resulting calibrated density loss probabilities are plotted in steps of 1% in
Figure 2.8, while cumulative loss probabilities are shown in Figure 2.9 for expiries 5y, 7y
and 10y and for both JSB and Entropy approaches. The first observation from Table 2.2 is
that the Entropy approach matches all market quotes almost exactly while the JSB approach
is relatively close for mezzanine tranches but performs poorly for the equity tranche 0-3 and
the super senior tranche 22-100.
The result for the equity tranche points to one limitation of the JSB approach for pricing
CDOs, especially evident through observing the densities in Figure 2.8 where JSB distribu-
tions yield zero probability to a zero portfolio loss event. However, given that defaults in a
credit portfolio are supposed to be rare events, a zero portfolio loss is clearly an event with
probability higher than zero. This is well captured by the Entropy approach for all expiries
as observed through the non-zero probabilities for zero portfolio loss in Figure 2.8. This
can also be explained through the cumulative loss distributions of Figure 2.9. Note that at
subordination 3% the JSB approach consistently place a higher probability of the tranche
0-3 being wiped out when compared to the Entropy approach, a fact that explains the re-
sulting higher spreads. On the other hand, from subordination 6% onward the cumulative
loss probabilities of both approaches are reasonably close, also explaining why the spreads
for mezzanine tranches from both approaches are not too far apart. Finally, the poor results
of the JSB approach on the super senior tranche can be explained by the rapid decay of the
distribution to zero for high subordinations.
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Tranche Base correlations (%)
(%) 5y 7y 10y
0-3 15.50 13.14 11.74
0-6 24.59 22.97 17.41
0-9 31.79 31.03 25.31
0-12 38.10 37.99 32.55
0-22 55.05 57.56 53.96
Table 2.3: Market quoted base correlations for iTraxx Europe Series 6 CDO tranches as of
15-Mar-2007
Figure 2.10: Plot of market quoted base correlations for iTraxx Europe Series 6 CDO
tranches as of 15-Mar-2007
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(a) 5y
(b) 7y
(c) 10y
Figure 2.11: Calibrated loss density probability distributions for 5y, 7y and 10y of JSB and
Entropy approaches in comparison to the Gaussian copula model with base correlations
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(a) 5y
(b) 7y
(c) 10y
Figure 2.12: Calibrated loss cumulative probability distributions for 5y, 7y and 10y of
JSB and Entropy approaches in comparison to the Gaussian copula model with 0-3 base
correlation
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(a) 5y
(b) 7y
(c) 10y
Figure 2.13: Calibrated loss cumulative probability distributions for 5y, 7y and 10y of
JSB and Entropy approaches in comparison to the Gaussian copula model with 0-6 base
correlation
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A useful comparison can be made with the standard market model which applies the Gaus-
sian copula∗ with base correlations. Table 2.3 shows the market quoted base correlations for
the iTraxx Europe Series 6 CDO tranches as of 15-Mar-2007 while Figure 2.10 shows the
well-known plot of these figures. These correlations map directly into the quotes from Ta-
ble 2.1 in similar fashion to how implied volatilities map into vanilla option prices through
the Black-Scholes model.† Figure 2.11 shows the previously calibrated JSB and Entropy
probability densities for 5y, 7y and 10y in comparison to 0-3 and 0-22 densities from the
Gaussian copula model respectively using 0-3 and 0-22 base correlations.‡ It is imme-
diately observed that also the Gaussian copula model with base correlations prescribes a
non-zero probability of no default, in line the results from the Entropy approach and further
stressing the previously discussed limitations of the JSB approach. The market price match-
ing and consistence of the results under the Entropy method are better observed through
the cumulative probabilities in Figures 2.12 and 2.13. This result lends credibility to the
Entropy method as it shows that its cumulative probabilities on subordination points 3%
and 6% match the ones achieved by the Gaussian copula for each of the two respective
base correlations.
A typical application of the parameters and probabilities calibrated previously is on pric-
ing tranches with subordinations different from the standard ones. For instance, Table 2.4
shows the results for tranche subordination from the CDX index on the iTraxx Europe Se-
ries 6 portfolio. However, the real usefulness of a pricing method for CDOs relies on the
ability to appropriately handle bespoke portfolios. These are portfolios that differ from the
standard iTraxx or CDX indices, in which the only information available is the cumulative
expected loss implied from CDS quotes of the underlying obligors, as previously discussed
in sections 2.2 and 2.3. In this case, the strategy relies on partially using parameters and
probabilities calibrated from the standard tranches and recalibrating them with the cumu-
∗Please refer to Appendix A.7 for details on a Monte Carlo implementation of the Gaussian copula model.
†Please refer to J.P. Morgan Securities [28] for a description of the widely used base correlations to price
CDOs with the Gaussian copula model.
‡Note that under the Gaussian copula with base correlations, each subordination point implies a dis-
tinct dummy probability density for which market prices of tranches under the respective subordinations are
matched. Please refer to J.P. Morgan Securities [28] for more details on the base correlation method.
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lative expected loss of the new portfolio. Societe Generale [48] shows the various methods
that are applied in the industry in order to interpolate the Gaussian copula base correlation
curve discussed in section 2.1.3 where, depending on the subordination level, each of those
methods perform quite differently while some exhibit critical limitations such as computed
negative spreads.
For the purpose of our application, a fictitious portfolio of 100 obligors is selected with
50 obligors assigned spreads from Cadbury Schweppes PLC and another 50 with spreads
from Carrefour.∗ These spreads are the source to the only information available on this
new portfolio, i.e., its cumulative expected loss shown in Figure 2.14. Table 2.5 shows the
results after applying the steps for bespoke portfolios described in sections 2.2.3 and sec-
tion 2.3.3 for the JSB and Entropy approaches, with the new portfolio cumulative expected
loss and upfront payment of 15% for the equity trance in all expiries. Apart from the 0-100
subordination, the results for JSB and Entropy approaches could not be more different. One
immediate point is that keeping the bj parameters from the iTraxx calibration as proposed
in section 2.2.3 for the JSB approach is an assumption that bears no reasonable connection
with the characteristics of the new portfolio. In the case of the Entropy approach, the spread
are calculated with probabilities that are unbiased, achieved through the minimization of
the relative entropy given prior probabilities (i.e., from the iTraxx calibration) and condi-
tional to the arrival of new information (i.e., cumulative expected loss of the new portfolio).
On this observation, there is no reason why the spreads from the Entropy approach should
not represent the real spreads for the tranches on the bespoke portfolio, as they are unbiased
estimates given available market information.
In conclusion, the Entropy approach clearly shows superior performance to the JSB ap-
proach on the calibration of standard indices tranches such as the iTraxx. However, it is
with tranches on bespoke portfolios that the real advantage of the Entropy approach is
revealed not only over the JSB approach, but also over the Gaussian copula with base cor-
relations. Given any information set, the Entropy approach implicitly takes into account
the dependence structure of the underlying portfolio as opposed to rely on parametric rep-
∗The spread curves of Cadbury Schweppes PLC and Carrefour can be found in Appendix A.6.
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Spread (bps)
Tranche 5y 7y 10y
(%) Entropy JSB Entropy JSB Entropy JSB
3-7 45.54 44.45 110.47 107.45 293.06 282.68
7-10 11.19 11.94 28.76 30.75 68.66 75.50
10-15 4.10 4.36 10.87 11.17 24.46 23.02
15-30 2.03 1.76 4.79 4.41 11.00 7.89
30-100 1.06 0.57 2.66 1.32 4.05 1.69
Table 2.4: Results for CDX tranche subordinations on iTraxx Europe Series 6 portfolio
Figure 2.14: Expected loss for iTraxx Europe and bespoke portfolios
Spread (bps)
Tranche 5y 7y 10y
(%) Entropy JSB Entropy JSB Entropy JSB
0-3 446.85 1007.96 780.84 1141.65 1131.07 1584.29
3-6 88.23 223.81 179.68 247.49 488.72 589.50
6-9 43.20 190.82 78.77 214.34 185.18 240.59
9-12 32.04 170.50 54.62 193.70 114.69 145.85
12-22 26.39 139.82 39.70 162.95 77.69 112.69
22-100 19.00 30.03 28.30 40.73 49.61 37.86
0-100 45.15 45.53 62.16 63.26 99.44 100.58
Table 2.5: Results for bespoke portfolio on iTraxx tranche subordinations and expiries
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resentations of dependence (e.g., correlation). In addition, the Entropy approach achieves
an unbiased estimate of the spread for tranches in bespoke portfolios, far from true from
the JSB approach and from the adopted market standard model Gaussian copula with base
correlations as demonstrated by Societe Generale [48]. For these reasons, we favor the
application of the Entropy approach described in section 2.3 as a more suitable method for
pricing CDO tranches.
Conclusion
In this chapter the Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO) was introduced in section 2.1.1
with a discussion of its characteristics, underlying securities, payoff structures and market
indices. This was followed by a review of the Gaussian copula model in section 2.1.2 and its
base correlation form in section 2.1.3 adopted by market participants as the standard model
for pricing CDOs. After representing the CDO mathematically through a payoff function
in section 2.1.4, the Johnson SB (JSB) approach for evaluating this payoff function was
formulated in section 2.2.2 followed by its calibration procedure in section 2.2.3. Similarly,
model formulation and calibration procedure were proposed in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 for
the approach applying entropy optimization techniques on the pricing of CDOs. Finally
the two proposed approaches were applied to a real case pricing in section 2.4, where the
Entropy approach stood out as the most suitable for pricing index and especially bespoke
CDOs.
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Chapter 3
Pricing Emission Reduction Purchase
Agreements (ERPAs)
Introduction
Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA) contracts are instruments linked to the
existence of a carbon market, more specifically to project activities aimed at reducing
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions to the Earth’s atmosphere. The implementation of such
projects is motivated by the impact that humans have made on the climate of the planet.
According to the scientific consensus,∗ the warming of the climate system is evident from
observations of increases in global average air and ocean surface temperatures as well as
through the melting of snow and ice causing sea levels to rise. With a high degree of confi-
dence, the cause for this has been associated with the enormous growth in GHG emissions
due to human activities since pre-industrial times. One immediate action that must follow
is adaptation, since some of the effects of climate change are already felt in various parts of
the world. Another crucial step is establishing alternatives that promote mitigation of GHG
emissions, with the objective of achieving “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations
∗For a comprehensive overview of climate science refer to Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) [22].
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in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with
the climate system.”∗
Key to both adaptation and mitigation is international cooperation, where governments
should avail themselves of a variety of policies and instruments to create the incentives
for action. The international carbon market is one such remarkable initiative created by
the Kyoto Protocol (KP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), adopted in December 1997 at the Conference of Parties 3 (COP3) in Kyoto,
Japan. The KP represented a significant milestone as for the first time governments ac-
cepted legally-binding constraints on their GHG emissions, with industrialized countries
(called Annex I parties) agreeing to reduce their collective GHG emissions on average to
5.2% below 1990 levels by 2012.† Under the hypothesis that where emissions reductions
are achieved is irrelevant to the planet’s climate system, the KP created innovative market-
based mechanisms aimed at achieving these reductions where they are least costly. The
International Emissions Trading (IET), Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) are the three KP market-based mechanisms that have effectively estab-
lished global markets for GHG emissions reductions and permits. These mechanisms give
the parties of the KP as well as private sector participants the ability to reduce emissions
in any part of the world where the cost of doing so is lowest in addition to claiming these
reductions towards their own emissions targets.
The KP established GHG emissions caps where Annex I parties are allocated Assigned
Amount Units (AAUs) in a quantity equal to their respective emissions target. At the end
of the compliance period (2012 for the 1st commitment period of the KP), parties must
surrender a quantity of AAUs equal to their actual emissions in the period. For parties
expecting emissions to exceed their original AAU allocation, one obvious solution is miti-
gation via domestic government policies and initiatives and/or by devolving national level
∗Article 2 of the The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) avail-
able at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/
1353.php.
†The reader is referred to http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/3145.php for
more details and current status of the KP.
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emissions caps to individual emitting installations such as power plants. An example of
the latter is the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), where installations
in the EU are imposed emissions caps in the form of European Union Allowances (EUAs)
allocations. Another alternative through the IET (KP Article 17) is by trading emissions,
where a party is able to meet its AAU shortage by purchasing the necessary amount from
another willing party that has a surplus. And yet another possibility is importing emissions
offset certificates generated through the other two KP mechanisms, i.e. CDM and JI.
The JI is defined under KP Article 6, where one Annex I party may invest in an emissions
reduction project activity in another Annex I party and by doing so generate Emission Re-
duction Units (ERUs) that will count towards its own KP target. This mechanism was orig-
inally devised to encourage investment in emission reduction activities from industrialized
countries to Annex I parties characterized as countries “in transition to a market economy,”
typically Eastern European countries from the former communist block. In contrast to the
IET, the JI is a baseline-and-credit system where project participants earn emissions re-
duction offsets (i.e., ERUs) through the implementation of a project activity that reduces
emissions below a certain baseline scenario representing the level of emissions that would
have happen in the absence of the project.
The CDM (KP Article 12) is also a baseline-and-credit system where project participants
may claim Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) through the implementation of project
activities that reduce emissions below a certain baseline scenario.∗ CDM offers Annex I
parties the possibility of importing CERs as a flexible alternative to how they meet their
emissions reduction targets, which in this case can be achieved at a lower cost in a devel-
oping country (KP non-Annex I) than it could be done domestically. By catalyzing green
investment efforts in developing countries, CDM also aims to achieve sustainable develop-
ment in those parts of the world that otherwise would be absorbed by immediate economic
and social needs.
Whether these mechanisms are effective in promoting a shift in long-term investment pat-
∗See UNEP’s publication “The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)” http://www.cd4cdm.
org/Publications/CDMintro.pdf for an introduction to the concept and benefits of the CDM.
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terns toward low carbon initiatives is a heated debate, and highly dependent on carbon price
signals coming from international and regional climate policy developments. However, it is
important to note that the KP market-base mechanisms have at least established the founda-
tions of future more successful mechanisms, a fact unquestionably verified by the notable
response to climate change efforts globally through increased levels of accountability in
emissions monitoring and management. And in the particular case of the CDM, a vibrant
entrepreneurial contingent has been unleashed in both developed and developing countries,
ranging from project developers to service providers, investors and financial institutions.
The administrative tasks of approving CDM project activities and issuing CERs are coor-
dinated by the UNFCCC, with approval of eligible projects going back as early as 2004.
Since then the number of projects in the pipeline has grown to about 2050 at the time of
writing,∗ and the resulting CERs have been an important source of emissions offsets as-
sisting Annex I parties and capped domestic installations meeting their emissions targets.
One example is the fact that Japan has relied heavily on CERs, although plans for a domes-
tic emissions trading scheme (ETS) are already moving forward†. In addition, CERs are
closely linked to the EU ETS‡ and its allowance instrument the EUA, where installations
covered by the scheme take advantage of cheaper CERs to achieve lower compliance costs.
The consequence of the importance and relative success of the CDM has been the increased
liquidity in the market for secondary CERs, i.e., those CERs that have been already issued
and are therefore available for delivery. In addition, CER Futures contracts were already
launched by the European Climate Exchange (ECX) for trading in its ICE Futures elec-
tronic platform in late 2007, with a significant increase in trading volumes since then.
Thus, it is not surprising that the CER is the underlying asset for an absolute majority of
all ERPAs signed to date. In the context of the carbon market, ERPAs define the terms
of generation, ownership and transfer of CERs from CDM projects while establishing the
∗Refer to project activities at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/index.html.
†See Point Carbon [41] for an overview of emissions trading schemes around the world.
‡The EU ETS is currently the main ETS in the world, adopting CERs via the EU Linking Directive which
allows installations to import CERs for meeting their emissions obligations.
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allocation of risks among the all parties involved. They are vital instruments to the func-
tion of the CDM market as they formalize the terms of the offtake of CERs by the buyers,
while ensuring that project participants are remunerated for their efforts in implementing
emissions reduction project activities. In some cases ERPAs may also play a crucial role in
securing early debt and/or equity financing for the project activities.
We limit the scope of this research to ERPA terms based on CER delivery, although in the
presence of appropriate market information the concepts and techniques presented can be
extended to other emissions offset instruments such as ERUs from JI projects and Volun-
tary Emission Reduction (VER) certificates from the various voluntary markets standards.
We continue in section 3.1 with a detailed analysis of the CDM, where its project cycle is
dissected for a subsequent mathematical representation. Then in section 3.2 we formulate
the payoff function of an ERPA, provide analyses of underlying drivers and mathemati-
cal meaning in the form of stochastic models, and expound on the calibration of model
parameters. Finally, in section 3.3 we establish a pricing algorithm and apply the models
and techniques proposed with a case study on a run-of-river hydro power CDM project
activities in China. We then close with our concluding remarks.
3.1 The CDM project cycle
In this section we make a detailed analysis of the CDM project cycle in order to derive an
accurate representation of the steps to be modeled in the formulation of the ERPA pricing
methodology. We start by introducing the diagram of Figure 3.1(a) which shows the CDM
project cycle in a workflow form, dividing the CDM project cycle into two major blocks
(Survival and Performance) and six intermediate process blocks.∗ In Figure 3.1(b) we
translate these processes into an accurate probability tree with respect to CER delivery
volume possibilities for each stage of a project. And finally Figure 3.1(c) illustrates a
simplified probability tree which allows for a tractable mathematical representation of the
∗A more detailed workflow of the CDM project cycle can be found in Institute for Global Environmental
Strategies (IGES) [20], while a comprehensive description of each intermediate process is given by the CDM
Rulebook at http://cdmrulebook.org/.
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CDM project cycle. Below we discuss each process in the workflow of Figure 3.1(a), how
it translates into CER delivery according to the probability tree of Figure 3.1(b), and the
rationale for the simplifications leading to the probability tree of Figure 3.1(c).
• Survival
This is the first process in the workflow of Figure 3.1(a), where a great number of steps
must be successfully taken before a CDM project idea becomes reality. We call it sur-
vival precisely because failure in any of these steps mean that the project will not mate-
rialize. The very first step is the development of a baseline and monitoring methodology,
which provides guidance on the calculation of the amount of emission reduction to be
achieved by the project as well as how it should be measured. Assuming baseline and
monitoring methodologies have been previously developed and approved∗, the process
really starts with a Project Idea Note (PIN). The PIN is a brief document (5-10 pages)
containing information about the project (type, location, anticipated emission reduction,
etc) as well as preliminary financial structure (indicative primary CER price, equity and
debt financing needed, etc). This is ideally the step where project participants secure
either financing or at least funds to cover for the costs of the CDM process.
The next step is the preparation of a Project Design Document (PDD)†, a complex task
usually undertaken by consultants hired by the project participants. The PDD is such
an important document in the CDM project cycle that no project can earn CERs without
one being developed, validated and accepted by a CDM Executive Board (CDM-EB). A
PDD contains more granular information on the project as compared to a PIN, including
thorough planning with timetables and milestones as well as technical description in-
cluding the technologies involved. However, two of the key components of a PDD have
∗Usually the case for a wide variety of emissions reduction activities See currently approved methodolo-
gies at http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/index.html
†PDD templates can be found at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/PDDs_Forms/PDDs/
index.html.
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(a) CDM workflow
(b) Complete CDM probability tree
(c) Simplified CDM probability tree
Figure 3.1: CDM workflow and probability trees
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to do with the core goals of CDM: additionality and sustainable development.
According to Article 12.5c of the Kyoto Protocol, CDM activities must generate emis-
sions reductions that are additional to any that would have occurred in the absence of
the project activity. This must be demonstrated by the PDD, implying that the proposed
project activity requires financial support in the form of CERs to become viable. The
challenge lies in performing a baseline analysis (by applying the baseline methodology)
which estimates the hypothetical reference level of emissions that would have occurred
without implementation of the project, the so called business as usual (BAU) scenario.
In addition to that, the PDD must also demonstrate that the project activity will support
the host country’s sustainable development path. Finally, emissions reduction must be
measured and therefore the PDD must include a monitoring plan based on a monitoring
methodology.
Once ready, the PDD must be submitted to a Designated Operational Entity (DOE) for
validation. This is the process of confirming that the proposed project activity meets the
requirements of the CDM and therefore is eligible to be registered as a CDM project.
Although project participants pay for validation services, the DOE is an independent en-
tity acting on behalf of the CDM-EB in order to perform the pre-registration background
work, which also includes consultation with stakeholders. The DOE is also the entity
submitting the request for registration which broadly contains a PDD, a validation report
and a Letter of Approval (LoA) by a Designated National Authority (DNA). A LoA can
be requested from the DNA anytime while the above previous steps are being under-
taken. The purpose of the LoA is for the DNA to confirm that it has ratified the Kyoto
Protocol, that it approves the participation of the proponents in the project activity, and
in the case of the host party, that the project will contribute to sustainable development
within its borders.
Referring to Figure 3.1(a), the survival stage starts at node 0. Throughout the steps above
until node 1, the issue lies on whether the project is able to survive from one step to the
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next. In reality this constitutes a binary process which is widely represented in finance
by probabilities of survival. This is illustrated in Figure 3.1(b) and Figure 3.1(c), where
p01 is the probability of survival from node 0 to 1 while 1− p01 quantifies the probability
of failure. The quantity 1.00 represents the reference amount of 100% of the emissions
reduction proposed in the PDD.
• Registration
The next step in the workflow of Figure 3.1(a) is registration, which represents the for-
mal acceptance by the CDM-EB that makes a project activity eligible to receive CERs
from its emissions reduction. The process starts with the submission of a request for
registration by the DOE that validates the project. Then the UNFCCC secretariat pro-
cesses the request, leading to the appointment by the CDM-EB of a CDM Registration
and Issuance Team (CDM-RIT) with the responsibility to appraise the request. Based
on the conclusions of the CDM-RIT, the CDM-EB may approve or reject the project
activity, or request a review in case at least three board members raise concerns with the
proposal. Causes for request for review vary from minor breach of existing guidance
on PDD preparation and documentation to major ones involving additionality and the
estimated emissions reduction by the project. DOE and project participants may have
to provide further inputs and the outcome of this process may be approval, rejection or
approval with a reviewed estimated emissions reduction for the project activity.
Showed by Figure 3.1(a) between nodes 1 to 2, this is now a process that has a more gran-
ular probabilistic profile as compared to the survival stage. The fact that PDD amounts
can be amended through the review process makes this granular approach a more accu-
rate representation of what happens during registration, as illustrated by Figure 3.1(b).
However, the distribution is in practice highly concentrated around 0.00 and 1.00 due to
higher likelihood of a project being either approved or rejected. Because this fact resem-
bles the behavior of a survival stage and in addition to difficulties in identifying reviewed
PDD amounts in the data, we choose to simplify its representation to the one in Figure
3.1(c). Now we have a single probability of survival p12 and any granular volumetric
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variation missed by this approximation can be captured at later stages by issuance and
delivery probabilities with reference to original PDD amounts.
• Operation
Figure 3.1(a) illustrates this post-registration stage which might not even exist in case
the project is already operational and the monitoring procedures are implemented. In
this case, generation of emission reduction eligible for CERs starts immediately after
registration is granted. Otherwise there will inevitably be a delay between the regis-
tration date and the official emission reduction start date. And despite registration, the
project could still be going through operational and financial issues that might prevent it
from ever generating any CERs.
This stage is showed in Figure 3.1(a) between nodes 2 to 3, while its contribution toward
delivery risk is represented by a single probability of survival p23 in both Figure 3.1(b)
and Figure 3.1(c). This is reasonable given the only impact this stage may have on CER
delivery is through operational failure, as previously discussed.
• Monitoring
The first monitoring activity effectively starts with the emissions reduction start date,
i.e., once the project is both registered and operational (Figure 3.1(a)). It involves the
measurement and analysis of emissions to determine the volume of emissions reduction
achieved by the project activity in a certain time interval. The monitoring activity must
follow the monitoring plan defined in the PDD, which provides for the collection and
analysis of all data relevant to the calculation of emissions reduction by the project. At
the end of every monitoring period, project participants must provide a monitoring report
to the DOE engaged to conduct verification and certification of the achieved emissions
reduction in order to then be able to receive CERs.
The monitoring process is located between nodes 3(n) to 4(n) in Figure 3.1(a) and this is
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the stage where actual emissions reduction performance occurs. The n between brackets
represents the fact that a project activity may have a number of monitoring periods until
expiry. This stage is the driver for the probabilistic behavior of emissions reduction
by CDM projects, illustrated in Figure 3.1(b) by the entangled set of possibilities. In
this case Figure 3.1(c) confirms that no simplification can be made given that in reality a
project can underperform or overperform its PDD emission reduction in each monitoring
period.
• Verification and Certification
This is another stage where DOEs play a central role, this time following a monitoring
activity as shown by the diagram in Figure 3.1(a). In the verification process, a DOE con-
firms the authenticity of emissions reduction by the project over the monitoring period
indicated in the monitoring report. This involves documentation and procedural checks,
on-site inspections and even use of additional data from independent sources. Project
participants in the end receive a verification report with the verified amount of emissions
reduction, which might differ from the one in the monitoring report. This is due to the
complexities of data processing and calculations in monitoring methodologies as well as
conservatism by the DOE in case of any deviations in the carried out monitoring activity
when compared to the registered monitoring plan. The next step in the process is called
certification, where the DOE formally certifies the emissions reduction achieved by the
project by means of written notice to the project participants, parties involved and the
CDM-EB.
This process is represented through nodes 4(n) to 5(n) of Figure 3.1(a) and is similar
to the case of registration, where Figure 3.1(b) illustrates a more accurate granular rep-
resentation. From the process description above, the appraisal by a DOE may conclude
on the certification of any level of emissions reduction in reference to the PDD. How-
ever, the same issues observed with registration apply here, which have to do with the
higher likelihood that a DOE will either approve or reject the monitored emissions re-
duction and the fact that verified versus monitored amounts are not easy to capture from
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the CDM data. For these reasons we make a simplification from a granular approach to
a survival process, and combine this stage’s survival probability with the one from the
issuance process (Figure 3.1(c)) discussed below.
• Issuance
Issuance is the final stage in the workflow of Figure 3.1(a), and represents the creation of
CERs equivalent to the amount of emissions reduction that have been generated, verified
and certified in respect of a CDM project activity. Issuance concludes with the credit-
ing of the CERs into the pending account of the CDM-EB in the CDM Registry, which
can then be forwarded to the accounts of parties and project participants. Similarly to
the registration process, a CDM-RIT is appointed to appraise the request. Based on its
conclusions, the CDM-EB may issue, reject or issue a reviewed amount. Note that a
levy of 2% is applied to any volume issued, and subsequently credited to a Share of Pro-
ceeds (SOP) account which currently provides the only source of funding for adaptation
projects.
Figure 3.1(a) shows this stage as the process flow from node 5(n) to 6(n). Again, while
a granular probabilistic approach is a more accurate representation as showed in Fig-
ure 3.1(b), we reduce it to a survival process as illustrated by Figure 3.1(c) due to similar-
ities with the registration and verification processes. We combine survival probabilities
from 4(n) to 6(n) into a single probability p46 given all issuance events will have to go
though verification, certification and issuance regardless of whether the project is at an
early stage or already monitoring emissions reduction.
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3.2 Formulation
3.2.1 Introduction
ERPA contracts define the terms of generation, ownership and transfer of CERs from CDM
projects, while establishing the allocation of risks among the parties involved. An ERPA
effectively formalizes the terms of CER offtake from a buyer, while for the seller it ensures
that the effort of implementing a CDM project translates into revenue through delivery of
CERs. In some cases ERPAs may also play a crucial role in securing early debt and/or
equity financing for the project.
In an ERPA the buyer (emitter of a cap-and-trade scheme, financial intermediary, etc) pays
a certain price structure to the seller (project participants) in exchange for delivery of issued
CERs under a certain quantity or volume structure, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. The major
elements of ERPAs are:
• Volume
– Delivery structure: full volume, capped and/or floored volume, etc
– Delivery schedule: as CERs are issued by the CDM EB, at pre-defined future dates,
etc
• Price
– Payment structure: prepaid, spot price on delivery, capped and/or floored price, etc
– Payment schedule: at inception of contract, upon delivery, at pre-defined future
dates, etc
• Legal
– Buyers and sellers rights, obligations, shares, etc
– Provisions for event of non-delivery
– Penalties for delays on delivery
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– Counterpart default events
– Other legal provisions and penalties
Figure 3.2: ERPA diagram
Legal aspects of ERPAs must not be underestimated and we encourage the reader to refer
to Baker & McKenzie [3] for more details on legal issues in the CDM market. However, in
this research we focus on the pricing elements of ERPAs which involve volume and price.
We continue with section 3.2.2 where we formulate the ERPA payoff function and pro-
pose a risk-neutral pricing scheme. This is followed by the mathematical development of
the dynamics (including calibration) for the major drivers of ERPA contracts, respectively
delivery time and volume in section 3.2.3 and carbon prices in section 3.2.4.
3.2.2 Payoff function
In the context previously described, ERPAs are effectively contingent claims on carbon
prices and delivery time and volume. Furthermore, as per diagram in Figure 3.2, an ERPA
can be mathematically represented by a swap with a payment legA and a CER delivery leg
B. In financial terms, a fair-valued ERPA is achieved when the present value of all expected
future cash flows of A and B match. This is mathematically expressed as
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A− B = 0,
A =
Nn∑
n=1
E [fn(Bn, Cn, En, Vn, tn, yn(tn))] +
Nj∑
j=1
UjE [Bj] ,
B =
Nn∑
n=1
E [Bn(tn)Cn(tn)gn(yn(tn))] ,
(3.1)
where:
• each n represents a payment event by the CER buyer under the payoff structure fn de-
fined by the ERPA, which matches a delivery event (illustrated by n between brackets in
Figure 3.1(c)) as per schedule and volume structure gn defined by the ERPA;
• each j represents a scheduled lump sum payment Uj by the CER buyer;
• Vi and Bi are respectively PDD volume and discount factor for a certain schedule i;
• Ci and Ei are dynamic drivers representing carbon prices for a certain schedule i, re-
spectively CER prices and any other carbon price driver that may be considered in the
ERPA (e.g. EUA or ERU);
• tn and yn are the dynamic drivers linked to delivery event n, respectively the delivery
time and volume;
• and E is the expectation taken under the risk-neutral measure.
Equation (3.1) is a general representation that is able to accommodate a wide range of
payoff structures, and implicitly takes into account interdependencies between the dynamic
variables. However, it is still not tractable, and it must be simplified in order to reach its
usable form. We do this by proposing the set of assumptions that follows.
Assumption 1. Bi is deterministic and independent of dynamic variables Ci, Ei, and yn.
Assumption 2. yn is independent of carbon prices Ci and Ei.
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Assumption 3. yn is independent of delivery time tn.
Assumption 4. tn is independent of tn−1.
Assumption 5. yn is independent of yn−1.
Assumption 1 is common in the mathematical finance literature when payoff functions are
not directly written on interest rates. In our formulation the discount factor Bi is a time-
dependent function of deterministic interest rates, interpolated according to tn or specific
schedules n and j as will become clear in section 3.2.4.
On Assumption 2, in theory low carbon prices should have the effect of diminishing the
incentive to develop emissions reduction projects that would earn CERs, while the opposite
is true for high carbon prices. On the other hand, this should be observed only as a long term
market-wide dependence, realized mainly when carbon prices are kept in certain extreme
low or high levels for a long period of time. Such circumstances are more likely to affect
long-term planning of future projects, having only a marginal effect on currently ongoing
initiatives. Furthermore, the design of cap-and-trade schemes (where caps are tightened
over time) coupled with expected higher future abatement costs should guarantee upward
trend in prices over time.
Assumption 3 is not exactly true from a post-2012 point of view. The capacity of projects to
produce CERs should in theory be affected when delivery happens in relation to post-2012
cutoff dates∗. Early stage projects might struggle securing financing given that the major-
ity of expected CERs from such activities would happen in post-2012 schedules. And in
already advanced stage projects, monitoring and verification costs might exceed post-2012
CER revenues, leading project participants to halt CER-related operations. Arguably mar-
ket participants already incorporate these considerations in ERPA transactions by focusing
on pre-2012 ERPA schedules and adjusting survival expectations of early stage projects
through due diligence.
∗There exist a great level of uncertainty on demand for CERs post-2012, given the KP 1st commitment
period expires then and that there is no international agreement in place to define post-2012 emissions targets.
As a result ERPAs generally impose a cutoff with dates up to Apr-2013, when delivered CERs may still find
their way into Phase 2 of the EU ETS.
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Assumptions 4 and 5 propose that delivery of CERs in a delivery event n are not dependent
on the outcome of delivery event n − 1. This is again not exactly true as indirect inter-
dependencies may emerge in practice during the operational life of the project. Besides,
issues with equipment performance and malfunctioning, fires and other accidental events
in the project’s installations affecting generation of CERs in n − 1 may still persist in the
next monitoring period. We assume that most disruptions are unlikely to linger in the inter-
est of project participants to maximize CER revenues, while the more extreme events are
expected to be covered by insurance and therefore beyond the scope our analysis.
We now apply the above assumptions to (3.1) to obtain
A− B = 0,
A =
Nn∑
n=1
E [fn(Bn, Cn, En, Vn, tn, yn(tn))] +
Nj∑
j=1
BjUj ,
B =
Nn∑
n=1
B(tn)E [Cn(tn)]E [gn(yn)] .
Note that E [Cn(tn)] under the risk-neutral measure is the CER Forward price which we
write as Cn(tn), yielding
A− B = 0,
A =
Nn∑
n=1
E [fn(Bn, Cn, En, Vn, tn, yn(tn))] +
Nj∑
j=1
BjUj ,
B =
Nn∑
n=1
Bn(tn)Cn(tn)E [gn(yn)] .
(3.2)
Equation (3.2) effectively reduces B to a sum of Nn independent delivery events, and can
now be used to formulate actual ERPA contracts. One typical payoff is defined by an
outright primary CER purchase price with respect to the PDD volume, where the buyer
agrees to pay a fixed price in exchange for all ussued CERs as they are delivered. In
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this case Uj = 0 and schedules m and n are equal, where the risk-neutral expectation
E [fn(Bn, Cn, En, Vn, tn, yn(tn))] becomes Bn(tn)VnP . Note that P is the fixed primary
CER price, calculated as
P =
∑Nn
n=1Bn(tn)Cn(tn)E [yn]∑Nn
n=1Bn(tn)Vn
. (3.3)
where E [yn] represents the expected CER delivery in each event n.
In a similar way, another common payoff is one where the buyer pays a floating price based
on a percentage of the secondary CER price. In this caseE [fn(Bn, Cn, En, Vn, tn, yn(tn))] =
Bn(tn)Cn(tn)VnP , which results in
P =
∑Nn
n=1Bn(tn)Cn(tn)E [yn]∑Nn
n=1Bn(tn)Cn(tn)Vn
. (3.4)
A pattern quickly emerges from (3.2), as the key to pricing ERPA contracts depends on
the ability to formulate and evaluate the expectationsE [fn(Bn, Cn, En, Vn, tn, yn(tn))] and
E [gn(yn)] under the risk-neutral measure. Although the payoff examples discussed above
are straightforward, this task becomes challenging as in reality fn and gn may be any func-
tional form. It is not uncommon to find collar price structures with capped and floored
floating prices, as well as volume delivery tranche structures where sellers commit to de-
liver up to a certain percentage of the PDD volume while keeping the excess as performance
upside.
Thus, depending on the form of fn and gn, closed-form solutions may not be available and
(3.2) must be evaluated numerically. One alternative is simulating the underlying drivers
in a Monte Carlo algorithm, evaluating the fn and gn for each path and taking their re-
spective expectations. What follows in the next two sections is the definition of stochastic
representations for the dynamic drivers in ERPAs as well as the calibration of their model
parameters.
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3.2.3 Emissions reduction delivery dynamics
Delivery dynamics and Johnson SB distributions
In this section we establish the dynamic behavior of tn and yn in terms of stochastic models.
First define
wn = Tn + αn,
tn = wn + h(wn)
(3.5)
as the model for tn. In (3.5), Tn is a deterministic variable representing the scheduled end
time of the nth monitoring period, taking into account all time delays due to early stages in
the CDM probability tree of Figure 3.1(c). On the other hand, αn is the actual independent
random variable representing the elapsed time taken by project participants to complete
and submit the monitoring report, by the DOE to verify and certify the emissions reduction,
and by the CDM-EB to issue the requested CERs. Finally, h(wn) is a function defined to
accommodate any specific delivery schedule in relation to issuance dates. For instance, for
actual issuance on 26-Mar-2010 with an ERPA agreed delivery date of 20-Dec-2010, the
value of h(wn) in the nth delivery event is a constant equal to 311 days.
Now define the model for yn as
yn = Vnβn (3.6)
where Vn is the PDD volume and βn is an independent random variable quantifying the
volume to be delivered in tn.
The key now is to determine the probabilistic law which governs the behavior of the random
numbers αn and βn. Observation of the CDM historical data indicates that these variables
are highly skewed and fat-tailed, thus not obvious candidates for the widely applied normal
distribution paradigm. Regarding their domain, it is quite intuitive that these variables must
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be non-negative and are capped by a maximum value. Time cannot go backwards while the
minimum possible CER volume delivered is zero. On the other hand, time is limited at the
far end by the expiry date of the project activity while volume is restricted by the fact that
it is physically impossible for a project activity to produce an infinite amount of emissions
reduction.
We found that the Johnson SB (JSB) distribution introduced in section 1.1 offers a suitable
probability density function to represent both αn and βn. Due to its reasonable tractability,
closed-form and semi-analytical solutions may be achievable in some particular cases of
payoff functions with JSB underlying variables as shown in the CDO pricing formulation of
section 2.2.2. However, the general case requires sampling of random numbers with (1.4c)
and application of Monte Carlo simulation. This is the path we follow in this research,
where we calibrate αn and βn as JSB variables, simulate tn and yn respectively with (3.5)
and (3.6) through sampling αn and βn, and finally apply tn and yn to the pricing of ERPAs
with (3.2).
Calibration of JSB parameters
The aim of this section is to formulate a method for the calibration of JSB parameters
of the random variables αn and βn discussed previously. In finance, the formulation of
appropriate parameter calibration methods are well known in the literature and in practice
to be key to the applicability of the model. The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing∗
states that if markets are arbitrage-free and complete, there exist an equivalent unique risk-
neutral or martingale measure through which prices of all assets are determined and have
the same expected rate of return (the risk-free rate).
In a practical model calibration exercise, the arbitrage-free markets assumption is absorbed
implicitly while a non-linear optimization routine applies the complete markets postulate by
matching the number of asset prices (equations) to the number of parameters in the model
(unknowns). However, complete markets are rarely the case in practice, which implies the
∗See Harrison and Pliska [19].
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existence of infinitely many equivalent risk-neutral measures. This usually translates into
an underdetermined nonlinear system where the number of unknowns exceed the number
of equations, clearly a case where the value of at least one parameter must be statistically
estimated or arbitrarily assigned.
In the case of carbon, instruments such as CER shortfall swaps (where a buyer pays a
seller to cover for CER delivery shortfall from ERPAs) or even plain volumetric options
on CER delivery would be ideal inputs to the calibration of JSB parameters for processes
(3.5) and (3.6). Unfortunately the CDM primary market has not yet reached this level
of sophistication, which makes the issue with incomplete markets on CER delivery quite
pronounced. In the absence of observable primary CER prices or other contingent claims
on CER delivery, the only available information that can be used in model calibration is
CDM historical delivery data.
However, even in incomplete markets we can still achieve unique equivalent risk-neutral
probabilities for CER delivery by applying the entropy optimization techniques introduced
in section 1.2. As discussed in that section, according to the minimum relative entropy (Mi-
nEnt) principle by Kullback and Leibler [31], an unbiased probability density is achieved
by minimizing the relative entropy in (1.20) given a prior distribution and conditional to
one normalization condition and a set of functional constraints respectively in (1.18) and
(1.19). Kapur and Kesavan [29] showed that the density f(x) found this way exists and is
unique because the relative entropy is a convex function.
This result is crucial to the underlying idea of our approach, that in the absence of further
market-based information, a least-biased probability density estimated through the mini-
mization of the relative entropy in respect to a prior distribution and a set of constraints
is the suitable choice for an equivalent risk-neutral measure. The reasoning is that among
an infinite number of equivalent risk-neutral densities and given the MinEnt principle, any
other density than the one that minimizes the relative entropy is biased and therefore must
not prevail the unbiased alternative. This idea is not new and has a parallel with the concept
of Minimal Entropy Martingale Measure (MEMM) introduced by Miyahara [37], which
later appeared in the literature on option pricing applications in incomplete markets.
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We now move to define f(x) as the JSB density function from (1.3c), which directly satis-
fies the normalization constraint. Given the available CDM historical data, the functional
constraints are moment functions defined by hk(x) = xk for the kth moment of x about
zero, while ck = mk is the kth sample moment about zero. For calibration straight from the
CDM data, the domain [XA, XB] can be discretized as a histogram in intervals [xi−1, xi)
such that g(xi) = pi > 0 is constant for every i. This ensures that no assumptions are
made on the prior distribution and that actual prior information derived from the data is
effectively used, thus preserving the goal toward an unbiased solution.
In order to reduce the relative entropy from (1.20) to a usable form, we start by splitting it
into two integrals A and B such that
K = A− B,
A =
∫ XB
XA
f(x) log f(x)dx,
B =
∫ XB
XA
f(x) log g(x)dx.
Because g(xi) = pi is constant for every i and given JSB(x) as the JSB cumulative proba-
bility distribution from (1.4c), the solution for B immediately follows as
B =
Ni∑
i=1
log pi [JSB(xi)− JSB(xi−1)]⇒
B =
Ni∑
i=1
log pi
{
Φ
[
a+ b log
(
xi − c
c+ d− xi
)]
− Φ
[
a+ b log
(
xi−1 − c
c+ d− xi−1
)]}
, x0 = c.
Now given the JSB density in (1.3c), we split log f(x) such that
log f(x) = log
[
b√
2pi
]
+ log
[
d
(x− c)(c+ d− x)
]
− 1
2
[
a+ b log
(
x− c
c+ d− x
)]2
,
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and rewrite A as
∫ c+d
c
f(x) log f(x)dx = A1 +A2 +A3,
A1 = log
(
b√
2pi
)
[JSB(c+ d)− JSB(c)] ,
A2 =
∫ c+d
c
log
[
d
(x− c)(c+ d− x)
]
b√
2pi
d
(x− c)(c+ d− x)
exp
{
−1
2
[
a+ b log
(
x− c
c+ d− x
)]2}
dx,
A3 = −1
2
[JSB(c+ d)− JSB(c)] .
Integrals A1 and A3 have closed-form solutions given by∗
A1 = log
(
b√
2pi
)
and A3 = −1
2
,
while A2 can be reduced to†
A2 = 2√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
log
(
1 + e
z−a
b
)
e−
1
2
z2dz − bd+ a
b
.
where z is the standard normal variable from the JSB transformation in (1.1) and (1.2c).
The remaining integral portion of A2 can be solved numerically through the quadrature
formula by Goodwin [16] discussed in section 1.3. We identify f(x) in (1.21) from the
integral in A2 as
f(x) =
2√
2pi
log
(
1 + e
z−a
b
)
.
∗Proof in Appendix B.1.
†Proof in Appendix B.1.
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In the case of A2 Goodwin’s method is appealing given its simplicity and suitability as
log
[
1 + e
z−a
b
]
→ z − a
b
for large values of z while a is finite and b > 0, leading to negligible error as explained in
section 1.3. We now make z =
√
2u in A2 and apply Goodwin’s formula to yield
A2 ≈ 2h√
pi
+∞∑
n=−∞
log
(
1 + e
√
2nh−a
b
)
e−n
2h2 − bd− a
b
.
Combining A and B leads to the final form of our objective function, defined by
K = log
(
b√
2pi
)
+
2√
pi
h
+∞∑
n=−∞
log
(
1 + e
√
2nh−a
b
)
e−n
2h2 − bd− a
b
− 1
2
−
Ni∑
i=1
log pi
{
Φ
[
a+ b log
(
xi − c
c+ d− xi
)]
− Φ
[
a+ b log
(
xi−1 − c
c+ d− xi−1
)]}
, x0 = c.
(3.7)
As for the moment constraint equations, we first write
µk(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
xkf(x)dx.
as the kth moment of variable x about zero. We know from the discussion in section 3.2.3
that the density of a JSB variable x maps exactly into the standard normal distribution
function through the transformation (1.1) and (1.2c). Thus, writing
x =
[
c+ d
(
1 + e
a−z
b
)]−1
results in
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µk(x) =
1√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
[
c+ d
(
1 + e−
a−z
b
)]−k
e−
1
2
z2dz,
where z is a standard normal variable. Once again we apply Goodwin’s formula, this time
to the moment equation of a JSB variable∗ where we make z =
√
2u in µk(x) and rewrite
it as
µk(x) ≈ h√
pi
+∞∑
n=−∞
[
c+ d
(
1 + e
a−√2nh
b
)]−k
e−n
2h2 . (3.8)
by omitting the error term εk(h). Equation (3.8) can be directly used in the calibration of
delivery time probability densities. As for delivery volume, it is applicable only to prob-
ability densities in the transition from 3(n) to 4(n) in Figure 3.1(c), i.e., the monitoring
stage where emissions reduction performance effectively occurs. In the general case, de-
livery volume in any other stage of the CDM probability tree must be corrected by a rate
of survival, as per discussion in section 3.1. For instance, if delivery volume performance
in node 4(n) is given by y4(n), then in node 6(n) we must have y4(n)p46 where p46 is the
verification and issuance rate of survival discussed in section 3.1. We incorporate this rate
of survival r ≤ 1 by making x→ rx, changing (3.8) to its more general form†
mk(x) ≈ h√
pi
+∞∑
n=−∞
{
r
[
c+ d
(
1 + e
a−√2nh
b
)]}−k
e−n
2h2 . (3.9)
The constraint equations in our formulation then become
mk(x)−mk(x) = 0, {k = 1 . . . Nk}, (3.10)
∗The application of Goodwin’s formula to the moment equation of JSB variables has been previously
performed by Draper [9].
†Interesting to note that (3.9) implies mk(x) ≈ µk(x)r−k.
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with mk(x) given by (3.9) and the sample moments mk(x) computed by
mk(x) =
1
Ni
Ni∑
i=1
xki .
Under this formulation, the calibration problem is reduced to minimizing (3.7) conditional
on the moment constraints in (3.10), with the goal to estimate JSB parameters for the
stochastic drivers α and β in (3.5) and (3.6). While all JSB parameters may be estimated via
this method, in practice we make only the distribution shape parameters a and b unknowns.
The reason for this relies on the fact that c and d define the bounds of JSB variables,
with c and c + d being respectively the lower and upper bounds. Concerning delivery
volume, we know that the minimum amount of CERs a project can deliver is zero, and
therefore by default c = 0. On the other hand, the maximum possible volume c + d is
restricted by intrinsic natural (e.g. hydraulic characteristics of the river in a run-of-river
hydro power project) and operational (e.g. capacity of wind turbines in a wind power
installation) constraints from a specific project. A similar argument applies to delivery
time.
Figure 3.3(a) shows an example of a JSB density calibration (dotted line) and sample data
(histogram) for delivery volume of CDM wind power projects in China. Figure 3.3(b) illus-
trates that the calibration converges to the final solution with about 4 moment constraints.
And Figure 3.3(c) shows the JSB calibration for survival rates in different nodes of the
simplified CDM probability tree, where survival rates lower than one have the effect of
drifting the probability mass to the left of the chart. Although the profiles in Figures 3.3(b)
and Figure 3.3(c) make sense from a calibration methodology point of view, one needs
to be cautious about the calibration process when using raw CDM data such as the one
in Figure 3.3(a). For instance, although the entropy calibration method leads to unbiased
probability distributions, the raw data used as prior probabilities themselves may not lend
itself suitable to generate meaningful JSB distributions. Figure 3.3(a) may be seen as one
example of data points are too dispersed while the data points in Figures 3.8(a) and 3.8(b)
are more suitable for JSB calibration. This limitation might be overcome through a pure
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entropy optimization approach in the same way as performed with CDOs, but this is a topic
for further research.
Another important issue is regarding the convergence of the calibration shown by Fig-
ure 3.3(b). Functions such as fmincon from Matlab can be used to solve the constrained
minimization problem posed by (3.7) and (3.10). However, the application of penalty func-
tions may provide a more efficient method to achieve convergence. A penalty method
replaces a constrained optimization problem by an unconstrained problem whose solution
ideally converges to the solution of the original constrained problem. The unconstrained
problem is formed by adding a penalty term to the objective function consisting of a penalty
function which acts as a measure of violation of the constraints. In this case, a constrained
optimization problem
min [K(a, b)]
conditional to
ck(a, b) = mk(a, b)−mk = 0, {k = 1 . . . Nk},
can be changed to an unconstrained problem defined by
min [K(a, b) + F(ck(a, b))]
Various families of functions F(ck(a, b)) have been studied in the literature, where some of
the more notable examples including static and adaptive methods are described by Smith
and Coit [47]. In our case, a typical static method could be proposed by defining
F(ck(a, b)) =
Nk∑
k=1
akc
2
k(a, b)
Chapter 3. Pricing Emission Reduction Purchase Agreements (ERPAs) 105
with the a penalty coefficient ak large for each constraint k. However, Smith and Coit [47]
point out that it can be difficult to find an effective and efficient penalty function and dif-
ferent approaches have been attempted with different levels of success depending on the
problem. Thus, this in itself is a topic for further research.
The next challenge in the calibration scheme is to work out the data that are used as input
to the formulation above. For this, Figure 3.4 shows a snapshot of some basic data series.
With reference to the CDM probability tree of Figure 3.1(c), Figure 3.4(a) shows project
activity data that can be used for generating historical delivery time data series of nodes 1,
2 and 3(n) as well as survival rates for nodes up to 3.∗ Note also that proper due diligence
on the specific project underlying the ERPA is an essential part of the process, as it helps
improving the information from historical data to better assess time delays and volumetric
risks in early stages. Regarding performance data, Figure 3.4(b) exhibits information that
can be used to generate volumetric data series for nodes 3(n) to 4(n) and time data series
for nodes 4(n) to 6(n). Volumetric data sample points are computed by dividing the issued
volume by the PDD volume, while time data sample points effectively quantify the time
difference from the end of the nth monitoring period until the date in which CERs are
credited into the registry account.
Another important aspect of the data in Figure 3.4(b) is the monitoring frequency. This is
observed as the time interval between nodes 3(n) and 4(n), with historical sample points
plotted in Figure 3.4(c) for the universe of projects in the CDM pipeline. Given an expiry
date or a certain cutoff date defined by the terms of the ERPA, knowledge of the monitor-
ing frequency is crucial to compute the number of delivery events N as an input into the
ERPA payoff equation (3.2). Monitoring cannot be represented as random variables but
should instead be either defined in the ERPA terms or worked out informally with project
participants. In theory there should be an incentive for project participants to shorten the
monitoring period (by increasing the frequency) for large projects in order to be able to
monetize CERs early enough. However, only a marginal inverse proportionality between
∗Survival rate information available from the Carbon Valuation Tool by Point Carbon can be used as a
starting point for early stage rates and combined with CDM historical data for later stages.
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(a) Calibrated JSB density with prior distribution from CDM data
(b) Convergence of JSB calibration with the number of moment constraints
(c) Calibrated JSB densities for different rates of survival
Figure 3.3: Calibration
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CER volume and monitoring period is observed in the data. This may be explained by an
increase in verification and certification fees over time, as well as less attractive secondary
CER market prices during the latest economic downturn.
One concern remains on the actual CDM data published online by the UNFCCC.∗. The fact
that the raw data is currently only available through a web browser interface and not open
to direct database queries is extremely disappointing to market participants, and effectively
unusable in any form of quantitative analysis. Various market players and information
providers have worked around this problem by laboriously building their own databases,
with continuous extraction of data from the UNFCCC web pages as they are made avail-
able. In some instances these proprietary databases are shared online, as it is the case of
the outstanding spreadsheets by the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES).†
Only from sources like this or by constructing proprietary databases one able to filter the
necessary data series and use it in practical applications such as the one of this research.
3.2.4 Carbon price dynamics
Carbon price drivers
The typical starting point for understanding and mathematically representing stochastic
variables is the observation of their historical time-series. Although a necessary step, this
is far from sufficient in the case of carbon. This is due to the fairly recent emergence
of carbon as an asset class, and mainly because of its link to some major fundamental
drivers. Before jumping to an assumption on the stochastic behavior of carbon prices,
it is paramount to understand these underlying drivers ranging from macroeconomic and
technological factors to elements in the market microstructure created by scope and design
of cap-and-trade systems. Keeping in mind that market prices are ultimately determined
by the balance between supply and demand, the goal of the analysis that follows is to
∗Available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/index.html.
†Available at http://hydmz001.iges.or.jp/en/cdm/.
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(a) Survival CDM data
(b) Performance CDM data
(c) Monitoring period versus PDD volume
Figure 3.4: Snapshot of CDM data
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identify clear signals of short and long-term direction for carbon prices. We leave climate
and carbon market policy purposely out of the the discussion, given they represent the very
reason for the existence of carbon as an asset class as opposed to being simply a price
driver. On this note, the analysis assumes that the EU ETS goes forward with Phase 3 and
that demand for CERs into the scheme continues into the post-2012 period.
• GDP growth
The fact that current economic activity is primarily dependent on fossil fuels explains
the strong influence GDP growth has on carbon prices. The rationale is that a growing
economy causes an increase in emissions through intensifying fossil fuel combustion
and other emissions-related activities. However, in a carbon constrained economy, this
has the effect of increasing the demand for carbon allowances or permits (the currency
of cap-and-trade systems) such as the EUA, in addition to emissions reduction offsets
such as the CER. A demand increase for carbon instruments in an environment with
either marginally decreasing or stable supply causes an upward trend in future expected
prices. This dependence is noticeable in the high correlation exhibited between carbon
prices and equities and oil, commonly understood as proxies for market sentiment on
GDP growth. Under the paradigm of economic growth versus prosperity, and assuming
a future thriving international carbon market, this driver sends a clear upward signal for
middle to long-term carbon prices.
• Marginal Abatement Cost (MAC) curve
The MAC curve quantifies the effort for incremental additional abatement of emissions.
Figure 3.5(a) shows the well known McKinsey global abatement cost curve which orig-
inally appeared in Enkvist, Naucle´r and Rosander [11], while Figure 3.5(b) illustrates a
MAC curve constructed by Bloomberg New Carbon Finance. These curves are catego-
rized by technology and read as estimates of the prospective annual cost per additional
ton of avoided CO2-equivalent emission. Despite the industry-wide criticism regarding
the use of such curves and even about their relevance, they do provide an indication of
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(a) McKinsey global MAC curve version 2.0
(b) Bloomberg New Carbon Finance MAC curve
Figure 3.5: Marginal Abatement Curve (MAC)
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the trend in future prices of carbon. In a carbon-constrained economy and under the
assumption of such a snapshot in the current state of low carbon technologies, carbon
prices are expected to fundamentally rise in order to match abatement costs in the long
run. Again, this sends an upward signal regarding long-term prices.
• Energy prices
Energy is one of the major contributors to emissions globally through its cycle of ex-
ploration and extraction, production and consumption. Particularly in power generation,
the combustion of fossil fuels for electricity generation is a widespread activity in both
developed and developing economies. For instance in the countries under the EU ETS,
the majority of the combustion installations use coal and gas and not surprisingly EUA
and CER prices have a close link with prices of these fuels. Key to this relationship is the
fact that coal has a higher emissions factor as compared to gas, i.e., generating electricity
with coal emits significantly more CO2 per MWh than the same activity using gas as fuel.
Thus, conditional to fuel switching capacity and under a cap-and-trade regime, the price
of carbon is expected to reflect the price differential between coal and gas as measured
in terms of dark and spark spreads. For instance, if coal prices become relatively cheap
when compared to gas, installations would have an incentive to switch to coal. In order
to compensate for the increase in emissions and thus keeping emissions commitments
on target, those same installations then demand more carbon allowances and/or offsets.
This increased demand for carbon instruments tends to drive carbon prices up and at
least partially diminishes the original attractiveness of coal as fuel. The converse is true
when gas becomes relatively cheap to coal.
Although generally accepted, this pattern is intermittent given its high dependence on the
currently limited fuel switching capacity in the EU, which can be exhausted under certain
circumstances. For instance, gas prices in the EU have plummeted over the course of the
recession in 2009 while coal has been more stable given its status as a global commodity.
In fact Asia has significantly driven coal demand in 2009 for restocking purposes due
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to its shorter recessionary period as compared to Western economies. This caused an
economic incentive to switch from coal to gas in the EU, leading to a relative disconnect
between carbon and energy prices in early to middle 2009, reflecting a system close to its
switching capacity. It is then logical to assess that energy as a driver points to a marginal
influence in carbon prices while levels are kept low in the short-term, but with a middle-
term upward trend due to the return of high demand for gas in EU economies emerging
from recession.
• EUA-CER spread
Despite the fact that EUA and CER represent the same one ton of CO2-equivalent emis-
sion, they are set apart by the design of the EU ETS through quantitative and qualitative
restrictions on imports of CERs. While the amount of CERs that industrial installations
can use is capped in Phase 2, CERs from large hydro power projects (usually but not
necessarily projects involving reservoir) and from land use, land use change and forestry
(LULUCF) are banned from entering the ETS. These restrictions have implicitly created
a distinction in the applicability of EUAs and CERs as compliance instruments, which
has led to a price differential between the two assets called EUA-CER spread.
Although the EU ETS does not impose EUA and CER cap or floor prices, the notori-
ous Chinese primary CER floor price has significantly impacted the way carbon prices
behave. This should be expected given that China currently represents close to 60% of
the total expected average annual supply of CERs from registered projects.∗ This depen-
dence is apparent in historical prices through the observation of high correlation between
absolute prices and their respective spread (Figure 3.6). This can only be explained by
the hypothesis of an implicit carbon floor price, which intuitively causes the tightening
of the spread when absolute prices get close. A similar conclusion may be drawn for
prices approaching an upper bound interpreted in the EU ETS as the cost of carbon cap-
ture and storage (CCS). We conclude that while the EUA-CER spread as a driver does
∗According to the CDM pipeline statistics as of 10-Feb-2010, available at http://cdm.unfccc.
int/Statistics/index.html.
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not provide obvious signals on the absolute levels of prices, it does indicate that carbon
prices are effectively bounded at fundamental floor and cap levels.
Figure 3.6: EUA-CER spread time-series
Price dynamics and calibration
The objective of this section is to define a mathematical representation for carbon prices in
the form of a stochastic process. Although none of the price drivers previously discussed
exhibit an exact functional relationship with carbon prices, they do offer clues of an up-
ward future middle and long-term trend with expected low levels in the short-term. This
observation has support in a study by Bole [6] which provides a literature review of sci-
entific models used to calculate fundamental global carbon prices. Many of these models
incorporate in one way or another the drivers previously discussed, in addition to scenarios
on climate policy-making. Based on a stabilization level of 450 ppm (parts per million) for
the atmospheric CO2 concentration∗, the results point out to a carbon price range of d31.4
to d76.6 by 2020.
∗This is the CO2 concentration level which is widely accepted by the scientific community and policy-
makers to be economically achievable, while yielding a high probability of keeping the planet’s surface
temperature below 2◦ by 2100. More details on climate scenarios and science can be found in IPCC [22].
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On these observations, we assess that carbon prices exhibit a clear drift that is not mean-
reverting but instead increases as a function of time. We now make an assumption common
from the literature, that the stochastic component follows a Brownian motion and that prices
are non-negative. This leads to
dSt
St
= (rt − qt)dt+ σtdWt, (3.11)
which is the well known Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). In (3.11), St represents
the spot carbon price, rt and qt are respectively the risk-free interest rate and the carry
rate (more broadly known in commodities as convenience yield), and σt is the volatility
parameter. In this setup we assume rt, qt and σt to be deterministic variables and functions
of time as illustrated by the subscript t. Given (3.11) and a certain horizon T , the solution
for ST can be written as
ST = S0 exp
[∫ T
0
(rt − qt − 1
2
σ2t )dt+
∫ T
0
σtdWt
]
,
where
∫ T
0
σtdWt is an Itoˆ integral∗. We rewrite
ST =
QT
BT
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
1
2
σ2t dt+
∫ T
t=0
σtdWt
)
,
where
BT = e
− ∫ T0 rtdt
and
∗See Kloeden and Platen [30].
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QT = e
− ∫ T0 qtdt
are discount factors associated with rt and qt, resulting in
FT =
QT
BT
S0 (3.12)
as the expected value of ST under the risk-neutral measure.
From the observation regarding carbon price bounds in the EUA-CER spread discussion,
we now add a collar feature to the process in (3.11) and define
Xt = min(max(St, Ka), Kb) = St + max(Ka − St, 0)−max(St −Kb, 0). (3.13)
We call this process a Bounded Geometrical Brownian Motion, where Ka and Kb are re-
spectively the lower and upper bounds which translate into the fundamental floor and cap
carbon prices. Once again we take the expectation under the risk-neutral measure in order
to obtain the actual Forward price of carbon, given by
E [XT ] = E [ST ] + E [max(Ka − ST , 0)]− E [max(ST −Kb, 0)]⇒
C(S0, Ka, Kb, T, BT , QT , σT,Ka,Kb) = F (S0, BT , QT )
+G(FT , Ka, T, σT,Ka ,−1)−G(FT , Kb, T, σT,Kb ,+1),
(3.14)
where F comes from (3.12) and G is the widely known Black model by Black [5] with
flags −1 and +1 representing respectively put and call option pricing functions.
This result is particularly useful for the calibration of QT and the well known volatility
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smile (or surface) σT,K , the only two unobserved quantities in the model. BT can be boot-
strapped from interest rate curves, S0 is the spot carbon price quoted in the market, T is
defined by the schedule in the contract terms, and Ka and Kb must be either assumed or
assessed through market analysis and fundamental research. Because rt and qt are deter-
ministic and ERPA payoffs are normally not written on these variables, we assume that
logBT and logQT are linear functions of the form a0 + a1x in order to simplify model
calibration and application. Thus, in formulating a non-linear least-square minimization
scheme we define
nT∑
i=1
[
CTi − C(S0, Ka, Kb, Ti, BTi , QTi , σTi,0)
]2
(3.15)
as one of the minimization functions given nT carbon Futures price quotes CTi . Depending
on the existence of option quotes, another minimization function is
nT∑
i=1
nK∑
j=1
[
GTi,Kj −G(CTi , Kj, Ti, BTi , QTi , σTi,Kj)
]2
. (3.16)
Here GTi,Kj represents option quotes for nT maturities and nK strikes. In Figure 3.7 we
show a simulated probability density for the CER Dec-09 Future price calibrated with the
above formulation. We assumed Ka = d7 (slightly below the Chinese floor prices) and
Kb = d40 (a low estimate for the cost of CCS in the EU). In this case only one Future
and one option market quote were used, allowing for the calibrating of only one QT and a
constant implied volatility σT . Note that the shape of the probability density in Figure 3.7
indicates the presence of a skew (better noticeable by the distance difference between the
median and its 1% tail confidence intervals) while fat-tails are also explicit. This is despite
the lack of enough option quotes to calibrate a volatility smile. This result is supporting
evidence that a market participant with a proper assessment of the fundamental floor and
cap prices would have at least a marginal temporary commercial advantage over other par-
ticipants in the carbon derivatives market. It is possible to improve the calibration method-
ology to bootstrap Ka and Kb as the derivatives market becomes more mature and more
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information on prices of options and other instruments is made available.
Figure 3.7: Simulated probability density for CER Forward Dec-09
3.3 Application
3.3.1 Pricing algorithm
We now bring all previously discussed elements together to propose a practical set of steps
to be applied in the pricing of ERPAs, described below.
1. Formulate the payoff in line with (3.2) and according to ERPA contract terms.
2. Identify the stage of the project in the CDM probability tree of Figure 3.1(c), as well as
country and technology category or methodology.
3. Extract delivery data series for time and volume from CDM historical data and collect
appropriate market quotes of Futures and options from secondary CER markets and
other relevant carbon price instruments (EUA, ERU, etc).
4. Quantify appropriate survival rates of the project according to its stage and any other
risks identified during due diligence (operational, financial, country, etc).
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5. Compute sample moments for delivery time and volume from the delivery data series.
6. Calibrate the delivery time stochastic process (3.5) through the optimization scheme
of (3.7) and (3.10), using the previously calculated sample moments and applying a
survival rate of 1.
7. Calibrate the delivery volume stochastic model (3.6) through the optimization scheme
of (3.7) and (3.10), using the previously calculated sample moments and applying the
previously defined survival rates.
8. Calibrate carbon price stochastic model (3.13) through the formulation of (3.15) and
(3.16).
9. Define payment, lump sum and monitoring schedules m, j and n in (3.2).
10. Sample M by Nn independent random numbers for stochastic processes (3.5) and (3.6),
where M is the number of paths in the Monte Carlo simulation and Nn is the number of
delivery events.
11. Sample M by Nm independent random numbers for stochastic process (3.13), where M
is the number of paths in the Monte Carlo simulation and Nm is the number of payment
events defined in the schedule of the ERPA, which may be equal to Nn for agreements
with payment and delivery upon CER issuance.
12. Apply sample random numbers to the payoff and compute price by taking the average
over the M paths of the Monte Carlo simulation.
The steps above can also be iteratively applied through an optimization scheme in order
to compute other parameters. For instance, given a certain ERPA structure and price, one
can bootstrap the break-even point for expected CER delivery volume or future carbon
price levels. This is particularly useful for simulation of future scenarios when managing
and hedging existent positions, or in stress test calculations to define necessary levels of
required capital buffer in the case of banks and other financial institutions. What follows
now is the discussion of a practical case applying the steps above to price ERPAs.
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3.3.2 Case study: run-of-river hydro power project in China
We now present a case study that illustrate the application of the methodology previously
described for a run-of-river hydro power project in China. These projects fall in the cat-
egory of renewable energy given they use a resource that is naturally replenished (water
flow) to generate electricity. When connected to national or regional power grids, their
supplied electricity lead to a reduction in future CO2 emissions that would have occurred
through electricity generation with fossil fuels (e.g. coal). In China this effect is clearly ob-
served through the emissions factor∗ of electricity grids, where the average figure for build
margin (i.e., emissions of new installations) and operating margin (i.e., emissions of exis-
tent installations) across all regional grids has consistently declined from 2007.† This result
is at least in part due to a highly successful CDM market fueled by government policies
geared toward promoting a shift to renewables.
In our particular case, run-of-the-river hydro power projects are types of hydroelectric gen-
eration whereby the kinetic energy carried by water flow is captured through the natural
downward flow and elevation drop of rivers. Typically water is diverted from the river at a
high point and fed down through a pipe called penstock to the powerhouse located down-
river, where the kinetic energy of the flow is transformed into electrical energy through the
turbines and the diverted water is returned to the stream.‡ Implementation of run-of-river
projects is relatively cheap and these projects offer long operational lifetimes with min-
imal maintenance. In addition, run-of-river projects are inherently more environmentally
friendly than reservoir projects which require the construction of dams, involving the flood-
∗The emissions factor measures the amount of emissions produced in tCO2 per MWh of electricity
generated. Figure B.1 in Appendix B.2 shows estimates of emissions factors for different fuels.
†Chinese emissions factors are published by the of Climate Change, National Development and Reform
Commission of the People’s Republic of China at http://cdm.ccchina.gov.cn/english/., sum-
marized in Appendix B.3.
‡A diagram is available in Appendix B.4 from FigureB.3(a).
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(a) Calibrated JSB delivery time against CDM data
(b) Calibrated JSB delivery volume against CDM data
(c) Calibrated JSB delivery volume for different survival rates
Figure 3.8: Delivery distributions for a run-of-river hydro power project
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ing of large areas of land.∗ This causes the destruction of existing forests that serve as CO2
sinks and a disruption in the local ecosystem, with the ultimate social impact of dislocating
communities that live in the flooded areas.†
For the purpose of our case study we define four fictitious Chinese run-of-the-river hydro
power projects, all with estimated PDD emissions reduction of 120 tCO2/year and different
only by their respective stage in the CDM probability tree of Figure 3.1(c):
• A → Node 0. This project is in the stage between submission of a complete PDD and
start of the validation, with 01-Jun-2010 as the expected emissions reduction start date
according to the PDD.
• B → Node 1. A request for registration has been submitted for this project, with an
expected emissions reduction start date following CDM-EB meeting 53 (EB53) on 26-
Mar-2010.
• C→Node 3(1). This project activity has been registered following EB52 and has started
its first monitoring period on 12-Feb-2010.
• D → Node 3(2). Registration was granted for this project on EB48 with an emissions
reduction start date of 17-Jul-2009, while it is currently undergoing a second monitoring
period with one previous issuance of CERs in relation to its first monitoring period.
Following the steps in our pricing algorithm, we leave the ERPA payoff formulation as a
subject of the subsequent sections. We then calibrate JSB distributions for delivery time
and volume from the CDM data for Chinese run-of-river hydro power projects. Results
of this calibration are shown in Figure 3.8, where in Figures 3.8(a) and 3.8(b) we plot the
calibrated JSB distributions for delivery time and volume respectively. In Figure 3.8(c) we
∗In order to harness a river’s full potential for electricity generation, some hydro projects involve a small
reservoir behind a dam constructed across the full width of the river. However, since flooding is minimal
these projects are still considered run-of-river. A diagram of such installations is available in Appendix B.4
from FigureB.3(b).
†This is primarily the reason for the EU ETS ban on imports of CERs from large hydro power projects,
which usually involve the construction of reservoirs.
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show JSB distributions for each project with their respectively assigned survival probabil-
ities, where we assume a survival probability of 100% for CER delivery from project D
given its proven success in previously achieving CER issuance. Regarding carbon prices,
we use the closing Futures prices for CER and EUA as well as one market implied volatil-
ity per Future contract horizon. We also assume d6 and d40 respectively for fundamental
floor and cap prices.
Finally, we construct the monitoring schedules by assuming subsequent 4-month monitor-
ing periods from the emissions reduction start date. No further delays are added to projects
C and D given they are already registered and operational. However, we add an extra 3-
month delay for project B given the possibility of registration review, and a 6-month delay
for project A due to an unrealistic PDD emissions reduction start date given its early stage
in the CDM process. In addition we define m = n in (3.2) (i.e., CERs are delivered to
buyers upon issuance) and establish the cutoff date for delivery as 01-Apr-2013. We pro-
ceed with the formulation of three different types of ERPA payoff and apply the parameters
above to assess the fair value of these contracts.
Fixed primary CER price
A typical fixed primary CER price payoff was introduced in (3.3). A more general for-
mulation with tranches on CER delivery volume can be achieved by defining a cumulative
volume variable
xn =
n∑
i=1
yi
and rewriting the delivery function as
gn = max(min(xn, Xk)−Xk−1, 0)⇒
gn = max(xn −Xk−1, 0)−max(xn −Xk, 0),
bounding the total volume between subordination levels Xk−1 and Xk with Xk > Xk−1.
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(a) Results
(b) Volume simulation
(c) Price simulation
Figure 3.9: Fixed primary CER price results and simulation
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For instance, projects with delivery volume capped at 100% of the PDD implicitly take
X1 = Vn and X0 = 0. Another example is from ERPAs that split delivery of CERs into
multiple tranches assigned to different buyers, e.g. X3 = 1.2Vn, X2 = 0.8Vn, X1 = 0.4Vn
and X0 = 0. Under this rationale, the fixed primary CER price can be generalized as
P =
∑Nn
n=1Bn(tn)Cn(tn)E [gn − gn−1]∑Nn
n=1Bn(tn)Vn
,
{k = 1 · · ·Nk},
(3.17)
where (3.3) is simply a particular case with Xk−1 = Xmin = 0 and Xk = Xmax = dNnVn
given c = 0 under a JSB distribution as the one in Figure 3.8(b).
In Figure 3.9(a) we present the results of a fixed primary CER price for each of the projects
in scope and for the non-capped and capped delivery volume cases. We also illustrate
the level of d8 as the unofficial Chinese price floor for hydro power projects, as well as
pre-registered and registered benchmark price ranges from indicative primary CER market
transactions∗. Note that in the case of no volume cap, projects B, C, and D validate quite
well the benchmark price ranges according to their respective stages. On the other hand,
the price for project A falls below both the pre-registration reference price range and the
Chinese price floor, and in this case project participants and buyers would struggle to get
such ERPA price approved by the Chinese government. This seems to be increasingly the
case with current low levels of secondary CER prices, giving clues to the difficulties that
participants in early stage Chinese CDM projects have to endure as well as the level of
concessions that willing buyers must make to gain access to these primary CERs.
In the case of capped volume at 100% of the PDD, note that the only result that reaches its
respective price band is the price for project B. However the only concern is still project A
due to the Chinese floor, while the other lower prices are justified since project participants
are remunerated by the possibility of upside from the project’s volume performance. And
finally, for completion we present in Figures 3.9(b) and 3.9(c) histograms with the simu-
∗Source: Point Carbon, Carbon Project Manager, February 1 2010.
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lation results of respectively volume and fixed primary CER price. As expected, note the
delivery volume distribution of project A is skewed toward zero delivery while the one for
project D shows several events of delivery in excess of 100% of the PDD. Also note the
wide distribution for the fixed primary CER price due to high market implied volatility of
secondary CERs.
Collared floating CER structure
Figure 3.10: Collar payoff diagram
One alternative to the fixed primary CER involves floating structures where the ERPA price
is defined as a percentage over the prevailing secondary CER market price. While the most
common of these structures is defined in (3.4), a more general payoff involves collars where
the ERPA price can float between a floor and cap price as shown in Figure 3.10. Writing
the payoff function as fn = Bn(tn)E [min(max(Cn(tn), Ca), Cb)]Vn, or
fn =
Nn∑
n=1
Bn(tn)
E
[
PCn(tn) + P max
(
Ca
P
− Cn(tn), 0
)
− P max
(
Cn(tn)− Cb
P
, 0
)]
Vn,
(3.18)
where Ca and Cb are respectively the ERPA floor and cap prices, and P is the floating price.
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Applying this equation to (3.2) with gn = E [yn], we chose to define the ERPA floating
price and the floor level in order to solve for a fair value of the cap price. We show this in
Figure 3.11, where floor and cap levels are plotted on the top of the price scenarios simu-
lated in the fixed primary CER case. Note that ERPAs on projects B, C and D would easily
pass the Chinese floor price hurdle due to their agreed minimum CER price of d8. These
ERPAs shift a portion of the secondary CER price risk from buyers to project participants,
who are in turn compensated by the possibility of upside in future market prices.
Once again project A suffers from its low CER delivery expectation, where an ERPA with
agreed floor of d7 would be unlikely to go through. A floating price at 40% (as well as
lower percentages) of the secondary CER price combined with a floor price of d8 is not
achieveable as it requires a decrease in the cap that eventually leads to it reaching the floor.
This would configure a structure without any payoff scenarios, as intuitively demonstrated
in Figure 3.11 by the floor and cap lines meeting. On the other hand, this result also
shows how a different Chinese floor price policy could be enough to make ERPAs like this
turn into reality. Contrary to the original concerns that motivated the Chinese government
to establish price floors, in the case of floating price ERPAs project participants have an
upside which is paid for through a compromise in the agreed floor and cap prices.
Figure 3.11: Collar floating primary CER price results
Bespoke EUA structure
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The other ERPA payoff alternative we present is what we call a bespoke EUA structure.
These structures were more common during the early days of the CDM, more specifically
in the pre-2008 period when CER Futures contracts were either not traded or illiquid.∗ In
the absence of an accurate CER Forward curve, market participants had no choice but to
use the EUA Forward curve as a proxy for guidance on the pricing terms of ERPAs. In
some cases complex structures linked to EUA prices were established. One such structure
can be written as
fn = BnE


P En(tn) < 10.0
P − 4.0 + 0.4En(tn) 10.0 ≤ En(tn) < 15.0
P + 2.0 15.0 ≤ En(tn) < 20.0
P − 6.0 + 0.4En(tn) 20.0 ≤ En(tn) < 25.0
P + 4.0 En(tn) ≥ 25.0

Vn, (3.19)
where En is the EUA price on delivery event n, fn is the payoff function and P is a fixed
floor price.
The payoff diagram for (3.19) is plotted in Figure 3.12 for different EUA prices. The results
shown there are achieved by applying fn to (3.2) and minimizing the difference between
the swap legs A and B for P , where gn = E [yn]. Note from these results that projects
C and D immediately pass the Chinese floor restriction, while reaching an agreement for
project B is also a quite realistic prospect. Also note that although based on fixed price
rules, this structure offers significant upside to project participants but it does not improve
the prospects of an ERPA for project A. Although bespoke EUA structures are probably
only observed in legacy contracts, their impact in terms of risk and return still need to be
properly assessed and managed. Thus, this particular case demonstrates the ability of the
proposed approach to accommodate a wide variety of ERPA payoff functions.
∗Figure B.4 from AppendixB.5 shows that CER Futures started in 2007 with fairly low volumes, which
increased significantly from Mar-2008 onwards on the ICE ECX. Only then CERs started showing reasonable
liquidity and the price discovery essential to ERPA negotiations.
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Figure 3.12: EUA structure price results
Conclusion
A methodology for the pricing of Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA) con-
tracts has been proposed in section 3.2 with the formulation of a general payoff function,
followed by detailed analyses of CER delivery and carbon prices as underlying drivers in
addition to their respective stochastic modeling and calibration. In section 3.3 we have
shown the application of this methodology to run-of-river hydro power project activities in
China for three different payoff structures. The results for a fixed primary CER price struc-
ture validate well to benchmark prices from actual market transactions except in the case
of early stage projects, which in practice do experience difficulties in closing ERPAs given
the high level of uncertainties involved. We have also argued that the results observed for a
collared floating CER structure and a bespoke EUA structure are quite sensible given their
respective intrinsic payoff characteristics. We consider this to be a demonstration of the
level of flexibility and accuracy of the proposed methodology, awarding it an extra degree
of relevance for applications on the pricing of ERPAs.
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Conclusion
This thesis proposed alternative ways to price contingent claims written on portfolios of
credit instruments as well as on carbon underlying assets. We started in chapter 1 by intro-
ducing the mathematical tools used in the development of these topics. Then in chapter 2
we elaborated on the first topic involving the pricing of Collateralized Debt Obligations
(CDOs), where two alternative pricing approaches based on JSB distributions and entropy
optimization were proposed followed by results and comparison with market prices. After
that, we discussed the pricing of Emission Reduction Purchase Agreement (ERPA) con-
tracts in chapter 3, where a pricing methodology was formulated and an application shown
through a case study of run-of-river hydro power CDM project activities in China.
Given the feasibility of the proposed approaches, the research presented has the potential
to be extended beyond the scope of this thesis. On CDO pricing, for instance, the entropy
pricing approach can be improved to include a hybrid calibration combining both iTraxx
Europe and CDX North America market quotes. Especially on the pricing of ERPAs, the
application of entropy optimization techniques can be used to generate delivery probability
distributions as an alternative to relying on the JSB assumption proposed in section 3.2.3.
Furthermore, the carbon market is starting to transact on portfolios of CDM projects, and
the pricing of ERPA portfolios with price and delivery volume structured payoffs can be
explored with both JSB distributions and entropy optimization principles.
The results achieved were satisfactory and the learning experience rewarding. We conclude
with the hope for having planted the seed for further work on these topics and with the
motivation to continue forward with the future research opportunities mentioned.
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Appendix: CDOs
A.1 Analysis of Goodwin versus Gauss-Kronrod quadrature
In order to check appropriateness and efficiency of applying Goodwin’s formula for inte-
grals of the form (2.21), we tested it against more modern methods such as Gauss-Kronrod
quadrature as described by Shampine [45]. According to Shampine [45], the Matlab im-
plementation quadgk of the Kronrod extension brings the Gauss formula up to 15 points,
while we set the number of points of the Goodwin quadrature to 100. Figure A.1 shows the
a sample JSB distribution with a = 1.1630, b = 1.5063, c = 0.0000 and d = 2.0839 for
which this test has been applied. The Goodwin formula was hard-coded in Matlab while
for the Gauss-Kronrod quadrature we use the function quadgk in Matlab both to solve the
function:
ψ(y) =
1√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
e−
v2
2
1 + e
at−v
bt
dv
This integral results in 0.3310 for both Goodwin and Gauss-Kronrod, with the a negligible
error term below 10−12. The difference appears on the processing time, where it takes
1.5 milliseconds for the Goodwin method with 0.3 milliseconds for Gauss-Kronrod. The
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Figure A.1: Sample JSB distribution with a = 1.1630, b = 1.5063, c = 0.0000 and
d = 2.0839
difference in processing time of about 5 times is negligible for experimental and research
purposes, but may be significant to professional applications such as running large books of
derivatives in banks. This was expected given the significant lower number of points used
by the Gauss-Kronrod quadrature, and this alone might justify to switch from the Goodwin
method in a production environment.
A.2 Alternative method for time-dependent bj
The polynomial method proposed for bj is one way to turn it into a time-dependent variable.
Another way is to use the normal transformation ability of the JSB distribution to use a
time-dependent Brownian motion. In this case we can turn zt from (2.19) into
zt =
Wt√
t
,
where Wt is a Brownian motion. The calibration can then be achieved via a two-dimension
Monte Carlo simulation by sampling Wt for each t across N sample paths.
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A.3 Decomposition of εt from section 2.2.2
ε(t) =
∫ XM
XL
min(xt −XL, XU −XL)f(xt)dxt ⇒
ε(t) =
∫ XU
XL
(xt −XL)f(xt)dxt +
∫ XM
XU
(XU −XL)f(xt)dxt ⇒
ε(t) =
∫ XM
0
(xt −XL)f(xt)dxt −
∫ XL
0
(xt −XL)f(xt)dxt
−
∫ XM
XU
(xt −XL)f(xt)dxt +
∫ XM
XU
(XU −XL)f(xt)dxt ⇒
ε(t) =
∫ XM
0
(xt −XL)f(xt)dxt
−
∫ XL
0
(xt −XL)f(xt)dxt −
∫ XM
XU
(xt −XU)f(xt)dxt.
A.4 Solution for εt integrals A, B and C from section 2.2.2
First solve for A as
A =
∫ XM
0
(xt −XL)f(xt)dxt = E[xt]−XL,
Now let B be
B =
∫ XL
0
(xt −XL)f(xt)dxt,
which can be solved with integration by parts where
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g = (xt −XL)⇒ g′ = 1 and h′ = f(xt)⇒ h =
∫ xt
0
f(u)du,
∫ XL
0
gh′dxt = [gh]
XL
0 −
∫ XL
0
g′hdxt,
B =
∫ XL
0
(xt −XL)f(xt)dxt
=
[
(xt −XL)
∫ xt
0
f(u)du
]XL
0
−
∫ XL
0
[∫ xt
0
f(u)du
]
dxt ⇒
B = −
∫ XL
0
JSB(xt)dxt ⇒
B = −
∫ XL
0
JSB(xt)dxt,
where
JSB(xt) =
∫ xt
0
f(u)du.
Finally,
C =
∫ XM
XU
(xt −XU)f(xt)dxt
which again can be solved with integration by parts, as
g = (xt −XU)⇒ g′ = 1 and h′ = f(xt)⇒ h =
∫ xt
0
f(u)du,
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∫ XM
XU
gh′dxt = [gh]
XM
XU
−
∫ XM
XU
g′hdxt,
C =
∫ XM
XU
(xt −XU)f(xt)dxt
=
[
(xt −XU)
∫ xt
0
f(u)du
]XM
XU
−
∫ XM
XU
[∫ xt
0
f(u)du
]
dxt ⇒
C = (XM −XU)
∫ XM
0
f(u)du− (XU −XU)
∫ XU
0
f(u)du−
∫ XM
XU
JSB(xt)dxt ⇒
C = XM −XU −
∫ XM
XU
JSB(xt)dxt,
where once again
JSB(xt) =
∫ xt
0
f(u)du.
A.5 Solution for JSB(xt) from section 2.2.2
We first rewrite JSB(xt) in the general case as
∫ XB
XA
JSB(xt)dxt =
∫ XB
XA
P [z ≤ a+ b log xt
XM − xt ]dxt. (A.1)
By substituting variables, make
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u = at + bt log
xt
XM − xt ⇒ e
u−at
bt =
xt
XM − xt ⇒ XM − xt = xte
at−u
bt ⇒
xt =
XM
1 + e
at−u
bt
,
or,
dxt =
1
bt
XMe
at−u
bt(
1 + e
at−u
bt
)2du.
Applying this result to (A.1) results in
∫ XB
XA
JSB(xt)dxt =
∫ K(XB)
K(XA)
P [z ≤ u] 1
bt
XMe
at−u
bt(
1 + e
at−u
bt
)2du,
where
K(y) = at + bt log
y
XM − y .
But P [z ≤ u] is the cumulative normal distribution, or
P [z ≤ u] =
∫ u
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
v2
2 dv.
This results in
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∫ XB
XA
JSB(xt)dxt =
∫ K(XB)
K(XA)
∫ u
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
v2
2
1
bt
XMe
at−u
bt(
1 + e
at−u
bt
)2dvdu.
This integral can be solved by inverting the order of integration, which gives
∫ XB
XA
JSB(xt)dxt = A+ B,
where
A =
∫ K(XB)
K(XA)
∫ K(XB)
v
1√
2pi
e−
v2
2
1
bt
XMe
a−u
bt(
1 + e
a−u
bt
)2dudv
and
B =
∫ K(XA)
−∞
∫ K(XB)
K(XA)
1√
2pi
e−
v2
2
1
bt
XMe
at−u
bt(
1 + e
at−u
bt
)2dudv.
First we solve for A, where
A =
∫ K(XB)
K(XA)
1√
2pi
e−
v2
2
[
XM
1 + e
at−u
bt
]K(XB)
v
dv ⇒
A =
∫ K(XB)
K(XA)
1√
2pi
e−
v2
2
[
XM
1 + e
at−K(XB)
bt
− XM
1 + e
at−v
bt
]
dv ⇒
A = XM
1 + e
at−K(XB)
bt
[Φ(K(XB))− Φ(K(XA))]−XM
∫ K(XB)
K(XA))
1√
2pi
e−
v2
2
1 + e
at−v
bt
dv.
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Given that
XB =
XM
1 + e
at−K(XB)
bt
,
then
A = XB[Φ(K(XB))− Φ(K(XA))]−XM [ψ(K(XB))− ψ(K(XA))],
where
ψ(y) =
1√
2pi
∫ y
−∞
e−
v2
2
1 + e
at−v
bt
dv. (A.2)
and Φ is the cumulative normal probability distribution function. Now, we solve for B,
given
B =
∫ K(XA)
−∞
∫ K(XB)
K(XA)
1√
2pi
e−
v2
2
1
bt
XMe
at−u
bt(
1 + e
at−u
bt
)2dudv ⇒
B =
[
XM
1 + e
at−u
bt
]K(XB)
K(XA)
∫ K(XA)
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
v2
2 dv,
which results in
B = (XB −XA)Φ(K(XA))
given that
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XA =
XM
1 + e
at−K(XA)
bt
.
Substituting back A and B gives
∫ XB
XA
JSB(xt)dxt
= XBΦ(K(XB))−XAΦ(K(XA))−XM [ψ(K(XB))− ψ(K(XA))].
Finally we replace XA and XB by zero, XL, XU or XM according to (A.1) to result in
∫ XL
0
JSB(xt)dxt = XLΦ(K(XL))−XMψ(K(XL)),
∫ XM
XU
JSB(xt)dxt = XM −XUΦ(K(XU))−XMψ(K(XM)) +XMψ(K(XU)),
Then from (2.20)
ε(t) = E[xt] +XU [1− Φ(K(XU))]−XL[1− Φ(K(XL))]
+XM [ψ(K(XU))− ψ(K(XL))− ψ(K(XM))].
(A.3)
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A.6 iTraxx Europe portfolio and CDS spreads as of 15-Mar-2007
Figure A.2: iTraxx Europe portfolio and CDS spreads as of 15-Mar-2007
A.7 Monte Carlo implementation of the Gaussian copula model
The steps for implementing a Gaussian copula model under Monte Carlo simulation are as
follows.
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1. Calibrate Fm(τm) as the survival probability function from each individual obligor’s
credit curve m according to Li [33] or any other technique.
2. Sample unm independent uniformly distributed random numbers for N Monte Carlo
paths by M obligors.
3. Generate znm = Φ−1(unm) independent standard normally distributed random num-
bers.
4. GivenM byM correlation matrix C∗, generate the matrixR as the Cholesky decom-
position of C = RTR.
5. Compute the set of correlated normally distributed random numbers fnm = Rznm.
6. Transform fnm into a set of correlated uniform numbers u¯nm such that u¯nm = Φ(fnm).
7. For each path n and obligor m, imply the time-until-default τnm = F−1m (u¯nm). For
expiry T , if τnm ≤ T then obligor m defaults on path n and ynm = 1; otherwise it
survives and ynm = 0.
8. Default losses are accumulated for each path n as xn =
∑M
m=1(1− rm)ωmynm.
9. Density and cumulative loss probability distributions can be constructed and applied
to any payoff function including the CDO payoff of (2.16).
∗See J.P. Morgan Securities [28] for details on the base correlation method.
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B.1 Solution for A1, A2 and A3 in section 3.2.3
Let
A1 = log
(
b√
2pi
)∫ c+d
c
fSB(x)dx,
A3 = −1
2
∫ c+d
c
fSB(x)dx,
where fSB(x) is the JSB density given by (1.3c). Thus,
A1 = log
(
b√
2pi
)
[JSB(c+ d)− JSB(c)] ,
A3 = −1
2
[JSB(c+ d)− JSB(c)] .
where JSB is the JSB cumulative distribution function given by (1.4c). According to the
JSB transformation of (1.2c), the domain of x is defined as c ≤ x ≤ c + d. Therefore,
JSB(c+ d) = 1 and JSB(c) = 0, and
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A1 = log
(
b√
2pi
)
,
A3 = −1
2
.
Now let
A2 =
∫ c+d
c
log
[
d
(x− c)(c+ d− x)
]
b√
2pi
d
(x− c)(c+ d− x)
exp
{
−1
2
[
a+ b log
(
x− c
c+ d− x
)]2}
dx.
Make
u = log
(
x− c
c+ d− x
)
⇒ du
dx
=
d
(x− c)(c+ d− x) ,
and
eu =
x− c
c+ d− x ⇒ x =
(c+ d)eu + c
1 + eu
⇒
x− c = de
u
(1 + eu)
, c+ d− x = d
(1 + eu)
⇒
d
(x− c)(c+ d− x) =
(1 + eu)2
deu
,
Applying these results to A2 yields
A2 =
∫ +∞
−∞
[2 log(1 + eu)− d− u] b√
2pi
exp
[
−1
2
(a+ bu)2
]
du.
Now
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z = a+ bu⇒
dz
du
= b, d+ u = d+
z − a
b
=
bd− a
b
+
z
b
.
This result leads to
∫ +∞
−∞
(d+ u)
b√
2pi
exp
[
−1
2
(a+ bu)2
]
du
=
∫ +∞
−∞
bd− a
b
b√
2pi
1
b
e−
1
2
z2dz
=
bd− a
b
⇒
A2 = 2√
2pi
∫ +∞
−∞
log
(
1 + e
z−a
b
)
e−
1
2
z2dz − bd− a
b
.
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B.2 Estimates of emissions factors for different fuels
Figure B.1: Estimates of emissions factors for different fuels
B.3 Chinese emissions factors 2009
Figure B.2: Chinese emissions factors 2009 as published in Institute for Global Environ-
mental Strategies (IGES) [21]
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B.4 Run-of-river hydro power installations
(a) Water through penstock to the powerhouse downriver
(b) Water stored in a small reservoir behind a dam constructed across
the full width of the river
Figure B.3: Diagrams of two types of run-of-river hydro power installations
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Figure B.4: CER exchange trading in 2009
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